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ABSTRACT 
This study attempts to identify the effect of capital structure on overall financial performance 
of micro finance institutions (MFIs). The study used cross sectional data that contained 
information from 403 MFIs in 73 countries. Multivariate regression analysis was applied in 
order to get the results. Cost of funds and return on assets were used as measures for the 
performance of MFIs, and debt to equity and debt to assets were used as measures for the 
capital structure, in addition to 10 control variables. The findings of the study indicate that 
most of the MFIs are highly leveraged, they use approximately four times more debt financing 
than equity. Further the regression results revealed that total debt to assets and short term debt 
to assets have a positive and significant effect on cost of funds. Long term debt to assets also 
has a positive impact on cost of funds, but the relationship was not significant. Total debt to 
assets and long term debt to assets have a negative and significant effect on return on assets. 
Short term debt to assets also has a negative effect on return on assets, but the relationship 
was not significant. There were not detected any significance between the debt to equity ratios 
and MFIs performance in this study. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
Microfinance has been a hot topic in the media over the last years, and is not without 
disadvantages, but there are also many who benefits from it and are able to get a better life 
because of it. Financing is a scarce factor for many poor people around the world who wish to 
improve their livelihood. In order for microfinance institutions (MFIs) to be able to help these 
people gain access to financial sources they need to be able to cover their costs and earn 
profits. It is hard for MFIs to achieve their goals if they are not performing well financially. 
Capital structure decisions are an important factor for firm’s performance. I will therefore 
focus on the effect of capital structure on MFIs performance in this study. 
1.2 Objective of the study 
The title of this thesis is “The effect of capital structure on microfinance institutions 
performance”, and the main objective is to identify how capital structure affects the financial 
performance of MFIs, focusing on cost of funds and return on assets as measures of capital 
structure. In order to do this I will present elements that might have an effect on the overall 
performance and then I will study how they actually are affecting the performance of MFIs.  
In order to do this I have studied several variables regarding capital structure and 
performance, some of them have barely been tested before. I have used a large global dataset 
that contains information from 403 MFIs in 73 countries (Mersland, 2011). 
1.2 Structure 
This thesis is made up by six chapters, including the introduction chapter (chapter one). 
Chapter two gives an overview of the microfinance industry, it also includes different 
microfinance concepts, participants, products and services, performance of MFIs and 
performance indicators. 
Chapter three presents the theoretical framework of the study, which is different capital 
structure theories and empirical literature. The chapter also includes hypothesis and variables 
that are used in this study. 
Chapter four presents the data and research methodology that was used in this study, it also 
presents the econometric models that were used in the regression models. 
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Chapter five presents the regression diagnostics and the descriptive statistics to make the 
reader get to know the data, it also presents data analysis and the findings of the regression 
models that were performed to analyze the relationship between capital structure and MFIs 
performance. 
Chapter six summarizes the findings and presents a conclusion of the analysis. 
Recommendations for new research are also given. 
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2. MICROFINANCE 
This chapter gives a brief overview of the microfinance industry and includes different 
microfinance concepts.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Microfinance refers to giving poor and low income people with no access to financial services 
through the ordinary formal financial sector the provision of different types of small-scale 
financial services. The fundamental services that the MFIs provide are the same that 
conventional financial institutions offer to their clients, the only difference is the scale and 
method of service delivery (Ledgerwood, 1999). 
Here is a definition of microfinance used by Gateway (2012) that I will use throughout this 
thesis: “Microfinance is often defined as financial services for poor and low-income clients 
offered by different types of service provider” (Gateway, 2012). Some MFIs also provide 
enterprise development services, such as skills training and social services, these are not 
included in this definition, and it only focuses on the financial side of microfinance, which I 
also will do in this thesis.   
There have been a huge growth in the microfinance industry for over a decade, but there is 
still a long way to go, it only reaches a small percentage of its potential market worldwide 
(Ledgerwood & White, 2006). Microfinance can be a powerful instrument against poverty, 
but it is only when supply meets demand that the poor people can find their way out of 
poverty(Helms, 2006). According to the most recent estimates microfinance has reached one 
hundred and fifty million individuals worldwide (Armendariz & Labie, 2011). Still 90 percent 
of the population of the developing world do not have access to formal sector financial 
services (Robinson, 2001).  
Helms (2006) points out that there are three major challenges that defines the frontier of 
financial services for the poor: 
1. Scaling up quality financial services to serve large numbers of people (scale) 
2. Reaching increasingly poorer and more remote people (depth) 
3. Lowering costs to both clients and financial service providers (costs) 
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Up until now microfinance has been very dependent on international donor funding (Helms, 
2006). 
According to Fazle Hasan Abed “The poor remain poor because they are powerless. Once 
empowered , the poor are able to chance their lives and overcome seemingly impossible 
odds” (CGAP, 2006, p. vii). 
There is a huge demand for small scale commercial financial services among the world’s poor 
and low income people. The financial services can help them improve household and 
enterprise management, increase productivity, smooth income flows and consumption costs, 
enlarge and diversify their micro-businesses, increase their incomes, and empower their way 
out of poverty. But unfortunately the formal financial sector is rarely able to cover the 
demand for these financial services (Robinson, 2001). Credit is often widely available from 
informal commercial moneylenders, such as commercial moneylenders, pawnbrokers and 
rotating savings, and credit associations but typically at a very high cost to the client 
(Ledgerwood, 1999; Robinson, 2001). The nominal monthly effective interest rate can range 
from about 10 percent to more than 100 percent, which is many times the monthly effective 
rates of sustainable financial institutions, this rate are usually 2-5 percent (Robinson, 2001).  
 
2.2 Clients 
The clients of microfinance are typically self-employed, low-income entrepreneurs from both 
rural and urban areas. As mentioned in the definition above from Gateway microfinance is 
provided to poor and low-income clients, but even though they are poor they are generally not 
considered to be among the “poorest of the poor”(Ledgerwood, 1999).  Microfinance is often 
provided to clients who are traders, street vendors, small farmers, service providers, 
craftsmen, small producers and to other individuals or groups at the local levels of developing 
countries (Ledgerwood, 1999; Robinson, 2001).  The majority of the clients are women, only 
33 percent of all microfinance clients are men (CGAP, 2012). 
All though microfinance can be a powerful instrument against poverty is not always the 
answer. For people who are extremely poor and badly malnourished, ill, and without skills or 
employment opportunities there might be other kind of support that may work better (Helms, 
2006; Robinson, 2001). Such people need food, shelter, medicines, skill training, and 
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employment, and when they are ready to work microfinance might be the next step 
(Robinson, 2001). 
 
2.3 Providers 
There are many different types of microfinance providers, they can be ranged from informal 
to formal (Ledgerwood, 1999). The level of formality depends on the sophistication of the 
organizational structure and governance, but it also depends on the degree of oversight or 
supervision by governments. (Helms, 2006). In table 2-1 you can see an overview of the 
different providers of microfinance.  
Figure 2-1 The spectrum of microfinance providers 
 
Note: ROSCAs = rotating savings and credit associations; ASCAs = accumulating savings and credit associations; 
CVECAs = Caisses Villageoises d’Èpargne et de Crédit Autogérées; FSAs = financial service associations; SHGs = 
self-help groups; NGOs = nongovernmental organizations; NBFI = nonbank financial institution 
Source: (Helms, 2006, p. 36) 
The most common way for poor people to access financial services are through the informal 
sector. Informal providers have a more simple organizational structure than the formal ones, 
and they are not supervised by the government. These providers consist of friends and family, 
moneylenders, pawnbrokers, community savings clubs, deposit collectors, and agricultural 
input providers, traders, and processors. Member based organizations like CVECAs, FSAs, 
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AHGs and cooperative financial institutions are often organized in a more formal way, and 
they typically rely on their members own savings as the main source of funds (Helms, 2006). 
NGOs are in between the informal and the formal financial institutions. They have been 
pioneers in the development of microfinance, and are often associated with a more social 
mission. But in the past ten years they have moved in a more commercial direction, and 
pushing the poverty frontier. Many of the NGOS are also donor dependent and high cost 
operational, because it is harder to become sustainable when working with the poorest and 
more remote clients (Helms, 2006). 
Formal financial institutions are chartered by the government and are also subject to banking 
regulations and supervision (Ledgerwood, 1999). These providers consists of NBFIs, state-
owned banks and postal banks, rural banks, specialized MFI banks and full-service 
commercial banks. These institutions have an unfortunate history in the microfinance sector 
for their unwillingness to serve the poor. But they also have an enormous potential for making 
financial systems truly inclusive. Their strengths are broad range of services, own capital, 
wide branch networks and the funds to invest in banking systems and skills (Helms, 2006). 
On average the clients of banks are less poor than the ones of NGOs. But banks do have much 
wider outreach and they are also more efficient. Therefore, according to Armendariz & 
Morduch (2010), these differences implies that there is a need for balance, where commercial 
lenders and nonprofit institutions can coexist and work in separate niches (Armendariz & 
Morduch, 2010). As mentioned before the informal institutions are an important source for 
financial services, but in this thesis I will mainly be focusing on the formal ones and some 
NGOs, because these are registered.  
 
2.4 Products and Services 
There are a variety of products and services that MFIs can offer to their clients, these are 
mainly financial services. In addition, some MFIs provide nonfinancial services. Here is a 
brief description of the most common products that MFIs offer their clients: 
Credit service 
The MFIs lend out credit to people that normally do not have access to it from the formal 
financial market. Loans are mainly made for productive purposes, but also for consumption, 
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housing and other purposes. MFIs have in general three ways of lending out credit, which is 
to individuals, groups or village banks. Individual loans are provided to individuals that can 
guarantee that they are able to repay and have some level of security. By combining methods 
for lending decisions from formal and informal financial institutions MFIs have successfully 
developed effective models for individual lending. Another lending methodology is group 
lending, which consists of groups of people who have a common wish to access financial 
services. Finally we have the “Village Banking model”, where MIFs uses larger groups of 
between 30 to 100 members, and lend out credit to the group itself rather than to individuals 
(Ledgerwood, 1999). 
Poor people are not able to provide collateral, and this is primarily the reason why they are 
excluded from the formal credit sources (Helms, 2006). Information asymmetry is a major 
problem for the MIFs when providing services to the clients. MFIs are therefore subject to 
adverse selection, this occurs when they are unable to determine which costumers are likely to 
be more risky. They also have the problem of moral hazard, which is the case when MFIs are 
unable to ensure that the clients are putting in enough effort to make their investment projects 
successful, or if the clients try to abscond with the MFIs money (Armendariz & Morduch, 
2010). 
Saving service 
MFIs are also providing micro-saving to enable poor and low-income people to store their 
money safe and give them the possibility to earn a return on savings (Ledgerwood, 1999). 
Savings can help households to build up assets to use as collateral, it can also help them better 
smooth seasonal consumption needs, finance major expenditures and self-insure against major 
shocks. We can distinguish between two types of savings, compulsory savings and voluntary 
savings. Compulsory savings can be considered as part of a loan product rather than an actual 
savings product, it works as a collateral for the loan received. There has been some criticism 
to compulsory savings because many of the savings accounts came with so many strings 
attached that they hardly looked like savings accounts (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). The 
other kind of saving type is voluntary savings. This is not an obligatory part of accessing 
credit services, and is provided by the MIFs to borrowers and non-borrowers. Voluntary 
savings is a lot easier to use than compulsory savings, but it is still not optimal (Ledgerwood, 
1999).  
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Insurance service 
Micro-insurance are provided by MFIs to enable poor and low-income people to reduce their 
risk. The most common insurance products are life insurance and health insurance, but they 
can also provide weather insurance, property insurance and other types of insurance. But not 
all of the insurance products have been so successful, one of the main challenges is adverse 
selection and moral hazard. The interest in micro-insurance is growing, but it still does not 
have the same width as microcredit. (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). 
Credit cards and payment service 
Some MFIs are beginning to offer services like credit cards and payment services, but it is 
still in an early phase, and not very widespread. Credit cards allow poor and low-income 
people to access credit when they need it, and have advantages such as streamline operations 
and an ongoing line of credit to borrowers, enabling them to supplement their cash flow 
according to their needs. They can also minimize administrative and operative costs for the 
MIFs. The use of credit cards is still very new, and can only be used when the adequate 
infrastructure is in place. Payment services include check cashing and check writing 
privileges, it also include the transfer and remittance of funds from one area to another 
(Ledgerwood, 1999). 
Social service 
Some MFIs also provide social service, or nonfinancial service, such as social intermediation 
and enterprise development to improve the well-being of their clients. They also include 
health, nutrition, education and literacy training. Most MFIs offer social intermediation to 
some extent depending on their objectives. It has been shown that it is easier to establish 
sustainable financial intermediation systems with the poor in societies with high levels of 
social capital. But providing financial and social services are two separate activities which 
may have conflicting objectives. It is for example rare for nonfinancial services to be financial 
sustainable. Another problem is that it might be difficult to identify and control the costs per 
service, which makes it difficult to measure the self-sufficiency of the financial services 
(Ledgerwood, 1999) 
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2.5 Performance of MFIs 
MFIs are facing a double challenge: they have to provide both financial services to the poor 
(outreach) and also cover their costs in order to avoid bankruptcy (sustainability). Hence to 
assess MFIs performance both dimensions must be taken into account. But as Blankenhol 
points out it is not always easy to measure the social aspect of microfinance: 
“There are no widely accepted measure for assessing the social performance of MFIs, 
outreach always being defined in terms of several indicators, like percentages of female and 
rural clients or the average loan size”(Balkenhol, 2007, p. 153). 
There are several arguments for evaluating and measuring the performance of MFIs. 
 “Microfinance works best when it measures-and discloses-its performance. Reporting not 
only helps stakeholders judge costs and benefits, but it also improves performance. MFI needs 
to produce accurate and comparable reporting on financial performance as well as social 
performance” (Helms, 2006, p. xii). 
Meyer (2002) uses “The Critical Microfinance Triangle” to evaluate the performance of 
MFIs. This triangle is portrayed in Figure 2-2, there are three general policy objectives: 
outreach to the poor, financial sustainability, and welfare impact. There are required 
performance criteria for each objective and all three must be measured to thoroughly evaluate 
microfinance performance. Meyer (2002) further explains Figure 2-2 like this: 
“The inner circle in the Figure 2-2 represents MFI innovations in technology, policies, 
organization, and management that affect how well each objective is met. The outer circle 
represents the environment within which microfinance operates that also affects performance. 
This environment broadly includes the human and social capital possessed by the poor, the 
economic policies of the country, and the quality of the financial infrastructure that supports 
financial transactions. Improvements in the environment make it easier for MFIs to reach the 
three objectives” (Meyer, 2002, p. 2). 
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Figure 2-2 The Critical Microfinance Triangle 
 
Source: (Meyer, 2002, p. 3) 
 
Outreach to the poor 
Outreach is commonly understood as the number of clients served. But according to Meyer 
(2002), cited from (Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-vega, & Rodriguez-meza, 2000) the 
concept of outreach is multidimensional and can be divided in four: 
1. The number of persons now served, which previously were denied access to formal 
financial services. These persons will usually be the poor because they cannot provide 
the collateral required for accessing formal loans, they are perceived as being too 
risky to serve, and impose high transaction costs on financial institutions because of 
small size of their financial activities and transactions (Meyer, 2002). 
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2. The number of women served: Women often face greater problems than men in 
accessing financial services (Meyer, 2002). 
3. The depth of outreach is important because the poorest of the poor face the greatest 
access problems. So to evaluate how well the MFIs reach the very poor some measure 
of depth of outreach is needed (Meyer, 2002). 
4. The variety of financial services: it has been shown that the poor demand and their 
welfare will be improved if efficient and secure savings, insurance, remittance transfer 
and other services are provided in addition to the loans that are the predominant 
concern of policy makers (Meyer, 2002). 
According to Navjas et al. (2000) there are six aspects of outreach: 
1. Depth is referred to as;“the value that society attaches to the net gain from the use of 
microcredit by a given borrower” (Navajas et al., 2000, p. 6). Poverty is a good proxy 
for depth, because society places more weight on the poor than on the rich. 
2. Worth to users is how much a borrower is willing to pay for a loan. 
3. Cost to users is referred to as the cost of a loan to a borrower. 
4. Breadth is the number of users. 
5. Length is the time frame in which a MFI produces loans. 
6. Scope is the number of types of financial contracts that are offered by a MFI. 
(Navajas et al., 2000) 
 
Financial sustainability 
Financial sustainability is another aspect when evaluating performance. Meyer (2002) states 
that;  
“The financial sustainability of MFIs is important as the poor benefit most if they have access 
to financial services over time rather than receive just one future loan but denied future loans 
because the MFI has disappeared” (Meyer, 2002, p. 4). 
According to Meyer (2002) there are two levels of financial sustainability that can be 
measured; operational self-sustainability and financial self-sustainability. Operational self-
sustainability means that operating income is sufficient to cover operating costs. Financial 
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self-sustainability means that the MFI also can cover the costs of funds and other forms of 
subsidies received when valued at market rates (Meyer, 2002). 
Microfinance has received a lot of attention as an important poverty alleviation tool. 2005 was 
by the UN declared to be the international Year of Microcredit, and in 2006 Mohammad 
Yunus received the Nobel Peace prize. These developments have led to high expectations 
about the potential poverty-reducing effects of microfinance among policy-makers and aid 
organizations. But, as stated in (Armendariz & Labie, 2011): 
“In order to be able to make a significant and long-term contribution to reducing worldwide 
poverty, MFIs need to be successful in extending loans to poor borrowers, while at the same 
time being able to at least cover the costs of their lending activities, i.e., they may need to 
focus on being financial sustainable in the long run” (Armendariz & Labie, 2011, p. 174). 
 
Impact  
The last aspect in the Critical Microfinance Triangle that is measured when evaluating 
performance is welfare impact. Impact assessment is by Meyer (2002) defined as; “attributing 
specific effects, impacts, or benefits to specific interventions, in this case, improved access to 
financial services” (Meyer, 2002, p. 5). One of the main objectives of MFIs is to reduce 
poverty. When measuring if microfinance really is a poverty alleviation tool, selecting which 
definition of poverty to use is required. Measuring the impact on clients of financial services 
is the most difficult and controversial aspect when evaluating performance, because of the 
methodological difficulties and high costs involved in conducting robust studies. It has been 
argued that the most important evidence of impact should be whether or not MFI clients 
continue to use the services (Meyer, 2002).  
When measuring the impact or the benefits from financial services the benefits can be divided 
into economic and noneconomic benefits. 
Economic benefits: 
 Traditional or new investments and production activities that firms and households 
engage in due to additional liquidity in the form of loans received.  
 Consumption smoothing and changes in firm and household balance sheets, such as 
holding less inventories due to the availability of additional financial resources. 
13 
 
Noneconomic benefits: 
 Empower women client in cultures where their economic and social opportunities are 
limited. 
 Improved nutrition and hygiene, education, participation in family planning, and 
improved self esteem. 
(Meyer, 2002) 
 
2.6 Performance indicators 
In this section I will discuss some of the most common indicators used to measure MFIs 
performance. According to the Technical Guide of Performance Indicators for Microfinance 
Institutions (2003) there are four main categories of performance indicators: portfolio quality, 
efficiency and productivity, financial management and profitability (MicroRate & 
InterAmericanDevelopmentBank, 2003) 
Portfolio quality 
“Portfolio quality is a crucial area of analysis, since the largest source of risk for any 
financial institution resides in its loan portfolio. The loan portfolio is by far an MFI’s largest 
asset and, in addition, the quality of that asset and therefore, the risk it poses for the 
institution can be quite difficult to measure. For microfinance institutions, whose loans are 
typically not backed by bankable collateral, the quality of the portfolio is absolutely crucial” 
(MicroRate & InterAmericanDevelopmentBank, 2003, p. 2).  
Portfolio quality for MFIs are often measured by Portfolio at Risk (PaR), which measures the 
portion of the loan portfolio “contaminated” by arrears as a percentage of the total portfolio. 
A loan is considered to be at risk if the payment on it is more than 30 days late. In addition to 
Portfolio at Risk, we can also use Write-Offs, Provision Expenses and Risk Coverage as 
portfolio quality indicators (MicroRate & InterAmericanDevelopmentBank, 2003). 
Efficiency and productivity 
“Efficiency and productivity indicators are performance measures that show how well the 
institution is streamlining its operations. Productivity indicators reflect the amount of output 
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per unit of input, while efficiency indicators also take into account the cost of the inputs 
and/or the price of outputs” (MicroRate & InterAmericanDevelopmentBank, 2003, p. 2). 
To measure efficiency and productivity we can use Operating Expenses, Cost per Borrower, 
Personnel Productivity and Loan Officer Productivity as indicators (MicroRate & 
InterAmericanDevelopmentBank, 2003). 
Financial Management  
“Financial management assures that there is enough liquidity to meet an MFI’s obligations 
to disburse loans to its borrowers and to repay loans to its creditors. Even though financial 
management is a back office function, decisions in this area can directly affect the bottom line 
of the institution” (MicroRate & InterAmericanDevelopmentBank, 2003, p. 2). 
To measure the financial management of a MFI we can use Funding Expence, Cost of Funds 
and the Debt/Equity ratio as indicators (MicroRate & InterAmericanDevelopmentBank, 
2003). 
Profitability 
“Profitability measures, such as return on equity and return on assets, tend to summarize 
performance in all areas of the company. If portfolio quality is poor or efficiency is low, this 
will be reflected in profitability” (MicroRate & InterAmericanDevelopmentBank, 2003, p. 3). 
 But in the same guide they also point out that all performance indicators tend to be of limited 
use (in fact, they can be outright misleading) if looked at in isolation and this is particularly 
the case for profitability indicators (MicroRate & InterAmericanDevelopmentBank, 2003). 
To measure the profitability of a MFI we can use Return on Equity, Return on Assets and 
Portfolio Yield as indicators (MicroRate & InterAmericanDevelopmentBank, 2003). 
 
2.7 Why measure performance? 
Performance measurements can be used for many different purposes. MFIs performance is 
measured for internal and external purposes. According to CGAP microfinance works best 
when it measures and discloses its performance. Reporting is not just helpful for stakeholders 
to judge costs and benefits, but it can also improve the performance (CGAP, 2006). In order 
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to get better at something we have to measure it, and one of the main reasons for measuring 
performance is to improve it. 
According to Simons (2000) business performance measurement is a tool to balance five 
major tensions within a firm: 
1. Balancing profit, growth and control 
2. Balancing short term results against long-term capabilities and growth opportunities 
3. Balancing performance expectations of different constituencies 
4. Balancing opportunities and attention 
5. Balancing the motives of human behavior 
(Simons, 2000) 
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3. CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES AND HYPOTHESIS 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework applied for the study, it includes a review of 
capital structure theory and also a discussion about the effect of capital structure on MFIs 
performance. This chapter also includes hypothesis and variables. 
3.1 Capital structure theory 
The capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization, including MFIs. This 
decision is important because of the need to maximize the returns off the firm, and also 
because of the impact such a decision has on the firm’s ability to deal with its competitive 
environment. The capital structure of a firm is a mix of different securities (Abor, 2005). Berk 
and DeMarzo (2007) defines capital structure like this:  “The relative proportions of debt, 
equity, and other securities that a firm has outstanding constitute its capital structure” (Berk 
& DeMarzo, 2007, p. 428).  
Today MFIs have an increasingly broad range of financial sources at their disposal. This gives 
them a wider funding diversification, but it also makes it much more complex to make 
decisions about capital structure. Better capital structure decision making amongst MFIs will 
minimize risk, maximize financial flexibility, and encourage the long-term solvency needed to 
provide sustainable financial services to poor clients (CGAP, 2007). 
Within finance capital structure has been a hotly debated issue for years. Several theories have 
been advanced in explaining the firm’s capital structure. Despite this researchers in financial 
management have not yet found the optimal capital structure. So far the best that the 
academics and practitioners have been able to achieve are prescriptions that satisfy short-term 
goals (Abor, 2005). The following section gives a review of the literature on the subject. 
3.1.1Modigliani and Miller Theorem 
One of the earliest important papers on capital structure is the work of Modigliani and Miller. 
In 1958 they published a seminal work in capital structure where they concluded to the 
broadly known theory of “capital structure irrelevance” where the capital structure is 
irrelevant to the value of a firm in perfect capital markets (Abor, 2005; Miller & Modigliani, 
1958). The law of one price implied that leverage would not affect the total value of the firm. 
Instead, it only changes the allocation of cash flows between debt and equity, without 
changing the total cash flows of the firm (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007). 
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The Modigliani and Miller theorem holds under the assumption of a perfect capital market, 
which means: 
 Individuals and firms trade at the same rates (homogenous expectations) 
 No taxes exists 
 No transaction costs exists 
      (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007) 
Modigliani and Miller proposition I: In a perfect capital market, the total value of a firm is 
equal to the market value of the total cash flows generated by its assets and is not affected by 
its choice of capital structure (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007, p. 432). 
Modigliani and Miller proposition II: The cost of capital of levered equity is equal to the cost 
of capital of unlevered equity plus a premium that is proportional to the market value debt-
equity ratio (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007, p. 438). 
This theorem has also been supported by others, such as (Hamada, 1969), and (Stiglitz, 1974). 
Modigliani and Miller propositions are also the foundations of capital structure today, 
however their theory is based on very restrictive assumptions that does not hold in the real 
world (Abor, 2005; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). Because of this there has according to 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) been several studies that has rejected the assertion made by 
Modigliani and Miller, such as (M. C. Jensen & Meckling, 1976), (Myers, 1977), (Williams, 
1987), (Harris & Raviv, 1990), (Grossman & Hart, 1982), and (M. C. Jensen, 1986). 
3.1.2 The tradeoff theory 
The tradeoff theory says that the firm will borrow up to the point where the marginal value of 
tax shields on additional debt is just offset by the increase in the present value of possible cost 
of financial distress. The value of the firm will decrease because of financial distress (Myers, 
2001). According to Myres (2001) financial distress refers to: ” the costs of bankruptcy or 
reorganization, and also to the agency costs that arise when the firm’s creditworthiness is in 
doubt” (Myers, 2001, p. 89).  The tradeoff theory weights the benefits of debt that result from 
shielding cash flows from taxes against the costs of financial distress associated with 
leverage. 
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 “According to this theory, the total value of a levered firm equals the value of the firm 
without leverage plus the present value of the tax savings from debt, less the present value of 
financial distress costs”: 
V
L
 = V
U
 + PV (Interest Tax Shield) – PV (Financial Distress Costs) 
Source: (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007, p. 501) 
This equation shows that leverage has cost as well as benefits.  
3.1.3 The pecking order theory 
The pecking order theory put forth by (Myres, 1984) presents the idea that firms will initially 
rely on internally generated funds, i.e. undistributed earnings, where there is no existence of 
information asymmetry, then they will turn to debt if additional funds are needed and finally 
they will issue equity, only as a last resort, to cover any remaining capital requirements. The 
order of preferences reflects the relative costs of the various financing options (Abor, 2005; 
Berk & DeMarzo, 2007).   
Myres (2001) lists up four points to explain the pecking order theory of capital structure: 
1. Firms prefer internal to external finance 
2. Dividends are “sticky” 
3. If external funds are required for capital investment, firms will issue the safest 
security first, that is, debt before equity. 
4. Each firm’s debt ratio reflects its cumulative requirement for external financing 
Source: (Myers, 2001, pp. 92-93) 
“The pecking order theory explains why the bulk of external financing comes from debt. It 
also explains why more profitable firms borrow less: not because their target debt ratio is 
low-in the pecking order they don’t have a target-but because profitable firms have more 
internal financing available. Less profitable firms require external financing, and 
consequently accumulate debt” (Myers, 2001, p. 93). 
3.1.4 The agency cost theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that it is inevitable to avoid agency costs in corporate 
finance. Agency costs are the costs that arise when there are conflicts of interest between 
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stakeholders and managers and between debt-holders and shareholders (Berk & DeMarzo, 
2007; M. C. Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe and agency relationship as: 
” a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person 
(agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent” (M. C. Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 5). 
The principals have two main problems; adverse selection, because they are faced with 
selecting the most capable managers, and the problem of moral hazard, because they must 
give the agents (managers) the right incentives to make decisions aligned with shareholder 
interests (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). 
Managers (agents) will generally make decisions that increase the value of the firm’s equity, 
because top managers often hold shares in the firm and are hired and retained with the 
approval of the board of directors, which itself is elected by stakeholders (principals). When a 
firm has leverage, a conflict of interest will arise if investment decisions will have different 
consequences for the value of equity and the value of debt. This kind of conflict is most likely 
to occur when the risk of financial distress is high. In some circumstances, managers may take 
some actions that can benefit shareholders but harm the firm’s creditors and also lower the 
total value of the firm (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defines agency costs as the sum of: 
 The monitoring expenditures by the principal, such as auditing, budgeting, control 
and compensation systems 
 The bonding expenditures by the agent 
 The residual loss, due to divergence of interest between the principal and the agent 
The share price that shareholders pay reflects such agency costs. So to increase firm value, the 
agency costs must be reduced (M. C. Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). 
In their paper Jensen and Meckling (1976) states that the existence of agency costs provide 
strong reasons for arguing that the probability distribution of future cash flows is dependent of 
the capital structure. They also argue that an optimal capital structure can be obtained by 
trading off the agency cost of debt against the benefit of debt (M. C. Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). 
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As stated above there does not exist any universal theory of capital structure, however there 
are several useful conditional theories, and some of these has been presented above (Myers, 
2001). But, does the capital structure influence the performance of a firm? Kyereboah-
Coleman (2007) argues that this relationship exists: 
“The capital structure of a firm is basically a mix of debt and equity which a firm deems as 
appropriate to enhance its operations. Thus, theory point out that high leverage or low 
equity/asset ratio reduces agency cost of outside equity and thus increases firm value by 
compelling managers to act more in the interest of shareholders, (Berger & Bonaccorsi-
diPatti, 2006). Therefore capital structure is deemed to have an impact on a firm performance 
against the position held by Modogliani and Miller in their seminal work of 1958” 
(Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007, p. 56). 
 This thesis focuses on examine the effect of capital structure on MFIs performance. 
 
3.2 Empirical literature 
There have been several studies investigating the determinants of capital structure of firms in 
different business sectors such as electricity and utility companies (Miller & Modigliani, 
1966), manufacturing sector (Long & Malitz, 1985; Titman & Wessels, 1988), non-profit 
hospitals (Wedig, Sloan, Hassan, & Morrisey, 1988), agricultural firms (Jensen & 
Langemeier, 1996) and joint venture-ships (Boateng, 2004). One of the main findings in the 
studies listed above is that industrial or sector classification is an important determinant of 
capital structure, because different sectors employ different mix of debt and equity for their 
operations (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). 
There have also been studies emphasizing on the relationship between capital structure and 
firm performance.  Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) argued that firm performance and 
capital structure could be closely correlated. They used data on commercial banks in the US 
and their results are consistent with the agency theory, under which high leverage reduces the 
agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging 
managers to act more in the interests of shareholders (Berger & Bonaccorsi-diPatti, 2006). 
Abor (2005) on “The effect of capital structure on profitability: an empirical analysis of listed 
firms in Ghana”, show a significantly positive relation between the short-term debt ratio and 
profitability (measured by ROE). However, a negative relationship between long-term debt 
ratio and profitability was established. But in terms of the relationship between total debt ratio 
and profitability, the results of his study indicated a significantly positive association between 
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total debt ratio and profitability (Abor, 2005). There have also been a number of other studies 
providing empirical evidence supporting this positive relationship between debt level and 
firm’s performance (Champion, 1999; Gill, Biger, & Mathur, 2011; Hadlock & James, 2002; 
Hutchinson, 1995; Roden & Lewellen, 1995; Taub, 1975). 
Abor (2007) on “Debt policy and performance of SMEs: evidence from Ghanaian and South 
African firms”, show that capital structure, especially long term and total debt ratios, 
negatively affect performance of SMEs (Abor, 2007).  There have also been some other 
studies that have provided empirical evidence supporting this negative relationship between 
debt level and firm’s performance (Cassar & Holmes, 2003; Fama & French, 1998; Gleason, 
Mathur, & Mathur, 2000; Majumdar & Chhibber, 1999; Titman & Wessels, 1988). 
 
Studies emphasizing on linkage between capital structure and performance in MFIs have been 
few. Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) on “The impact of capital structure on the performance of 
microfinance institutions” found that most of the MFIs use high leverage and finance their 
operations with long term as against short term debt. Further the study show that highly 
leveraged MFIs perform better by reaching out to more clientele, enjoy scale economies, and 
are therefore better able to deal with moral hazard and adverse selection. The study uses panel 
data covering a ten year period, 1995-2004, and consists of 52 MFIs from Ghana. ROA and 
ROE is used as performance indicators, and total debt, short term debt and long term debt are 
used as indicators for capital structure of MFI. As control variables size, age and risk level are 
used (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). 
 
Silva (2008) on “The effect of capital structure on MFIs performance” is consistent with the 
previous study by Kyereboah-Coleman (2007). This study found that total debt and short term 
debt ratio impacts positively and significantly on ROE while negatively and significantly on 
ROA. Long term debt ratio had a positively and significantly impact ROE but not 
significantly impact on ROA of MFIs. This shows that if MFIs use long term debt to finance 
their operations, there may not be a pressure on management of MFI. This further suggests 
that profitable MFIs depend more on long term debt financing. The study uses a data set 
which consists of 290 MFIs from 61 countries. ROA and ROE is used as performance 
indicators, while debt to equity, long term debt to equity, short term debt to equity, debt to 
assets, long term debt to assets and short term debt to assets ratios are used as indicators of 
capital structure of MFIs. There are also used some control variables in the study (Silva, 
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2008). Silva (2008) used exactly the same research problem as in this study, he has also used 
the same dataset, but in this study the dataset contains more variables. 
 
Kar (2012) seeks to answer the question “Does capital and financing structure have any 
relevance to the performance of microfinance institutions?” from an agency theoretic 
standpoint. The results of the study confirm the agency theoretic claim that an increase in 
leverage raises profit-efficiency. It also finds that cost efficiency decreases with decreasing 
leverage. Leverage have a negative significant impact on debt of outreach, but the study finds 
that capital structure does not have any noticeable impact on breadth of outreach. The study 
uses a panel dataset of 782 MFIs in 92 countries for the period 2000–2007. ROA, ROE and 
operating expenses per dollar lent (OELP) are used as indicators for financial performance 
and some of the indicators for capital structure are capital-asset ratio, debt-equity ratio, loans-
asset ratio and PAR30. 
 
3.3 Hypothesis and variable presentation 
In this section I will give present the variables that are used in the study and I will also present 
the hypothesis which be tested later in this thesis. 
3.3.1 Dependent variables 
In this study I employ cost of funds and Return on Assets (ROA) as the two dependent 
variables, and as measures of financial performance of MFIs. Even though there does not 
exists a unique measurement of financial performance in the literature, cost of funds was 
chosen because it is an important factor of banks and therefore also MFIs performance. ROA 
was also chosen because it is a widely accepted measurement of financial performance.  
Cost of funds 
The cost of funds ratio measures the average cost of the MFIs borrowed funds.  
This is one of the most important input costs for a financial institution, because a lower cost 
will generate better returns when the funds are deployed in the form of short-term and long-
term loans to borrowers. The spread between the cost of funds and the interest rate charged to 
their borrowers represents one of the main sources of profit for most financial institutions. 
(Investopedia, 2012). When comparing MFIs, cost of funds ratio shows weather they have 
gained access to low cost funding sources or not, such as savings. MFIs that can mobilize 
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savings often have a relatively low cost of funds, but this advantage is to some extent offset 
by higher administrative costs of mobilizing savings (MicroRate & 
InterAmericanDevelopmentBank, 2003). Cost of funds are calculated using the following 
formula (Mersland, 2011): 
C F=
Interests and fees paid on loans excluded payments on savings
Average outstanding loans from creditors
 
 
There have still not been many studies using cost of funds as a measure of financial 
performance. But according to the technical guide “Performance Indicators for Microfinance 
Institutions” (2003) cost of funds are used as a measure of MFIs financial management, which 
further is an indicator of performance.  (MicroRate & InterAmericanDevelopmentBank, 
2003).  
Return on Assets (ROA) 
ROA measures how well the institution uses all its assets. It is also an overall measure of 
profitability which reflects both the profit margin and the efficiency of the institutions. ROA 
is calculated using the following formula: 
  A=
 et income
Average assets
 
According to the technical guide “Performance Indicators for Microfinance Institutions” 
(2003) ROA are used as a measure of MFIs profitability, which further is an indicator of 
performance.  (MicroRate & InterAmericanDevelopmentBank, 2003). ROA is a widely 
accepted measure of financial performance, and is used in several studies.  
“In banks and other commercial institutions, the most common measure of  profitability is 
return on assets (ROA), which reflects that organization’s ability to deploy its assets 
profitably” (Rosenborg, 2009, p. 8). 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) on “The impact of capital structure on performance of 
microfinance institutions, Silva (2008) on “The effect of capital structure on MFIs 
performance”, and Kar (2012) on “Does capital and financing structure have any relevance to 
the performance of microfinance institutions?” all uses ROA as an indicator of financial 
performance in their studies.  ther studies by Abor (2007) on “Debt policy and performance 
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of SMEs: evidence from Ghanaian and South African firms” and  arendar et all (2007) on 
“Capital structure and financial performance: evidence from  man” also uses   A as 
dependent variable (Rao, Al-Yahyaee, & Syed, 2007).  
 
As stated above, according to theory and empirical studies both cost of funds and ROA are 
used to explain the effect that capital structure has on firm performance. Hence cost of funds 
and ROA measures the financial performance of the firm. There are a number of factors that 
may have an impact on performance (cost of funds and ROA), to show this a number of 
explanatory variables (Debt to equity ratios and Debt to asset ratios) and control variables 
(age of the firm, size of the firm, portfolio at risk, savings to assets, type of ownership and 
regional variables) where chosen. 
 
3.3.2 Explanatory variables  
The explanatory (independent) variables in this study are the short and long term debt to 
equity ratio and debt to asset ratio. These serve as a proxy for capital structure. 
Debt to equity ratio 
The debt to equity ratio is a common measure used to assess a firm’s leverage, or in other 
words the extent to which it relies on debt as a source of financing (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007).  
 
The following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis ii: Debt to equity ratio 
Hii0: Hii1 is not true 
Hii1: Debt to equity has a positive effect on COF and a negative effect on ROA 
 
Debt to equity ratio is calculated using the following formula: 
Debt to equity ratio = 
Total debt
Total equity
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In addition to the debt to equity ratio, long term debt to equity and short term debt to equity 
are also employed in this study. 
Debt to asset ratio 
The debt to asset ratio measures the amount of funds borrowed by the firm in relation to its 
assets. In regards to profitability, if the use of debt is increased it will lead to a higher debt to 
asset ratio.  
The following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis ii: Debt to asset ratio 
Hii0: Hii1 is not true 
Hii1: Debt to asset has a positive effect on COF and a negative effect on ROA 
 
 Debt to asset ratio is calculated using the following formula: 
Debt to asset ratio= 
          
           
 
In addition to the debt to asset ratio, long term debt to asset and short term debt to asset are 
also employed in this study. 
 
3.3.3 Control variables 
There are a number of factors additional to the capital structure that may have an impact on 
MFIs performance, this is why control variables are included in the model. The following 
control variables are used; age of the firm, size of the firm, portfolio at risk, savings to assets, 
type of ownership and regional variables. 
Age 
The age of the firm might also have an impact on the firm’s performance. According to 
(CGAP, 2009) age have three important effects on MFIs; higher number of loans may drive 
scale economics, higher average loan sizes may improve the cost structure and more 
knowledge about customers may streamline processes. 
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The following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis ii: MFI age 
Hii0: Hii1 is not true 
Hii1: MFI age has a positive effect on MFI performance 
 
The age of an MFI is calculated by subtracting the year that the organization started up with 
microfinance activities from the year of rating: 
Age = earrated   earstart up 
Size 
Due to economies of scale the size of a firm is considered to be an important determinant of a 
firm’s performance.  
 “Larger, well known firms have greater access to the long term capital market than smaller 
unknown firms. Smaller, unknown firms tend to either borrow short term by means of bank 
loans, or issue stock. This explains why larger companies will lean toward debt financing and 
smaller firms toward equity financing” (Rao et al., 2007, p. 5). 
 
The following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis ii: MFI size 
Hii0: Hii1 is not true 
Hii1: MFI size has a positive effect on MFI performance 
 
The size of an MFI is calculated by taking the natural logarithm of total assets. The following 
formula is used: 
Size = log(Total assets) 
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Portfolio at Risk (PaR 30) 
Is a measure for the quality of the portfolio, and how well the MFI are collecting their loans 
(CGAP, 2006). This variable states all portfolios with more than 30 days in arrears, and 
therefore has a risk of not being repaid (Mersland, 2011). This will have an effect on the 
earnings of the MFI, and therefore it may also have a negative effect on the performance.  
 
The following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis ii: Portfolio at risk 
Hii0: Hii1 is not true 
Hii1: Portfolio at Risk has a negative effect on MFI performance 
 
Portfolio at Risk can be calculated as follows: 
PaR = (Outstanding Balance on Arrears over 30 days + Total Gross Outstanding Refinanced 
(restructured) Portfolio) / Total Outstanding Gross Portfolio 
(CGAP, 2003, p. 6) 
 
Savings to assets 
This is a measure of how large proportion of the assets that are financed by savings. 
Many MFIs faced liquidity problems during the financial crises, and because of rising 
financial costs and the fluctuations of exchange rates affects many of the MFIs who rely on 
external finance, many of the MFIs have started to fund at least part of their lending activity 
by using local savings (Anonymous, 2010). As stated above MFIs that can mobilize savings 
often have a relatively low cost of funds, because savings is a source of relatively cheap funds 
(MicroRate & InterAmericanDevelopmentBank, 2003).  
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The following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis ii: Savings to assets 
Hii0: Hii1 is not true 
Hii1: Savings has a positive effect on MFI performance 
 
Savings to assets is calculated as follows: 
   
                       
            
 
 
Type of ownership 
I have made up a variable ranging from point 1 to 2, where 1 stands for NGO and 2 for Bank, 
into two dummy variables. The following definitions are used: 
     
                                
           
  
      
                                  
           
  
These variables are included in the study because I want to test if the type of ownership of the 
MFIs has any effect on performance. NGOs often have more poor clients than banks, which 
often are considered as a more risky segment of the population (Bogan, 2009). According to 
MicroRate (2003) NGOs generally achieve a higher ROA than licensed and supervised MFIs. 
This is explained by the fact that NGOs with low debt to equity ratios and limited possibilities 
to get funding in financial and capital markets, need to rely heavily on retained earnings to 
fund future growth. 
Regional variables 
Regional control variables show which regions the MFIs are operating in. I have included 
regional control variables in the regression models to see if there are any differences in the 
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performance between regions. The country variables from the dataset have been converted 
into five dummy variables sorted by regions, as shown below.  
      
                                                          
           
  
      
                                                     
           
  
      
                                
           
   
    
                                         
           
  
 
The following model will be excluded from the study: 
        
                                  
           
  
 
The dataset contains MFIs from 73 different countries, some are more represented than others. 
Figure 3-1 shows MFIs sorted by the five regions Eastern Europe or Central Asia, Middle 
East or North Africa, Latin America, Asia and Africa. Latin America have the largest share of 
37,22 percent of the MFIs included in the dataset, followd by Africa with 24,32 percent, 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia has a share of 18,36 percent, 16,38 percent of the MFIs are 
from Asia, while the Middle East or North Africa have the smallest share of 3,72 percent of 
the MFIs. 
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Figure 3-1: MFI sorted by regions 
 
 
Table 3-1 Summary of all the variables 
Variable Definition Hypotheses 
  COF ROA 
Dependent variables    
COF (Cost of Funds)  
 
  
Interest and fees paid on loans  
excluded payments on savings / 
Average outstanding loans from 
creditors 
  
ROA (Return on Assets) Net income / Average assets   
Independent variables (Outstanding Balance on Arrears over 
30 days + Total Gross Outstanding 
Refinanced (restructured) Portfolio) / 
Total Outstanding Gross Portfolio 
  
DE (Debt to Equity) Total debt / Total equity + - 
LDE (Long Term Debt to Equity) Long term debt /  Total equity + - 
SDE (Short Term Debt to Assets) Short term debt / Total equity + - 
DA (Debt to Assets) Total debt / Total assets + - 
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LDA (Long Term Debt to Assets) Long term debt / Total assets + - 
SDA (Short Term Debt to Assets) Short term debt / Total assets + - 
Control variables    
Age                        + + 
PaR (Portfolio at Risk) (Outstanding Balance on Arrears over 
30 days + Total Gross Outstanding 
Refinanced (restructured) Portfolio) / 
Total Outstanding Gross Portfolio 
- - 
SA (Saving to Assets) Total voluntary savings / Total assets + + 
Size Log of assets + + 
Bank Dummy variable (1,0)   
NGO Dummy variable (1,0)   
EECA Dummy variable (1,0)   
MENA Dummy variable (1,0)   
Asia Dummy variable (1,0)   
LA Dummy variable (1,0)   
Africa Dummy variable (1,0)   
+ when the independent variable increases (decreases) the dependent variable will also increase (decrease) 
- when the independent variable decreases (increases) the dependent variable will increase (decrease) 
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4. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This chapter presents the research methodology and data analyzing tools used in this study, it 
also gives a presentation of the data collection method, the sample of the study and the 
regression models that are used. 
4.1 Data collection method 
For this thesis I am using secondary data form a dataset compiled by Roy Mersland. It is 
always important to evaluate the credibility of the data when we are using secondary data 
(Jacobsen, 2005). The dataset have previously been used in academic research, such as 
Mersland and Strøm (Mersland & Strøm, 2010), Mersland and Strøm  (Mersland & Strøm, 
2009), and Beisland and Mersland (Beisland & Mersland, 2012), as well as in several working 
papers. Therefore I find the reliability of this dataset valid for this thesis.  
The dataset contains information from 403 MFIs in 73 countries. The data has been collected 
form risk assessment reports made by five rating agencies which are officially approved by C-
GAP: MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil and M-Cril. The reports range from 10 
to more than 40 pages of narrative and accounting information. There have been extracted up 
to 103 variables from up to eight financial years from the reports. All numbers in the dataset 
have been annualized and dollarized using official exchange rates at the given time 
(Mersland, 2011).  
The data have a certain sample selection bias, because it only includes data from MFIs who 
willingly have agreed to expose their accounts for scrutiny and rating. But, amongst the rated 
MFIs most of the rating categories are represented in the data (Mersland, 2011).  
4.2 Sample 
I have excluded two MFIs from the study, case number 194 and 198, due to missing data in 
the dataset. So the total number of MFIs in this study is 403. 
In the analysis I used the last year of registered data from each MFI, which was defined as 
year 0. I also performed a robust check on the regression models. The dataset is called cross-
sectional data, because all of the observations are from a single given point in time and 
represent different individual econometric entities from the same time (Studenmund, 2011). 
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4.3 Econometric model 
In order to identify the effect of capital structure on MFIs performance, multiple regression 
analyses were applied. Multiple regression is not only a technique, but a whole family of 
techniques which can be used to explore the relationship between one dependent variable and 
a number of independent variables (Pallant, 2007).  
Regression analysis is explained by Studenmund (2011) as: 
“Econometricans use regression analysis to make quantitative estimates of economic 
relationships that previously have been completely theoretical in nature. Regression is a 
statistical technique that attempts to “explain” movements in one variable, the dependent 
variable, as a function of movements in a set of other variables, called the independent (or 
explanatory) variables, through the quantification of a single equation” (Studenmund, 2011, p. 
5). 
There will often exist several explanatory variables in a given situation. In a multiple 
regression we can find the best relationship between the response and the different 
explanatory variables. The general multivariate regression model with K independent 
variables can be written as follows (Studenmund, 2011, p. 14): 
     Yi = β0 + β1X1i +β2X2i + …+ βkXki + εi                               (i = 1,2,…,n) 
Where Yi is the ith observation of the dependent variable, X1i,…,Xki are the ith observation of 
the independent variables, β0,…,βk are the regression coefficients, εi is the ith observation of 
the stochastic error term, and n is the number of observations. Y is an n x 1 vector of 
observations, X is an n x k+1 vector which contains k explanatory variables for the ith firm, β 
is a +1 x 1 vector of the parameters, and ε is a n x 1 vector of disturbance.  
As mentioned above, there exists a whole family of different techniques within multiple 
regression. In this study I have chosen to use the Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) estimation 
which is the most widely used. OLS is a regression estimation technique which calculates the 
    so as to minimize the sum of squared residuals (Studenmund, 2011). 
In order for the OLS estimators to be the best available, the classical assumptions must be 
met. Because of this, an important part of the regression analysis is to determine whether 
these assumptions hold for a particular equation, which I will do later in this study. If not, we 
have to make some assumptions. 
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The classical assumptions are as follows (Brooks, 2008, p. 44): 
1. The errors have zero mean;  
          
2. The variance of the errors is constant and finite over all values of x;  
          
    
3. The errors are linearly independent of one another; 
             
4. There is no relationship between the error term and corresponding x variate 
(explanatory variable); 
              
5. The error term    is normally distributed; 
         
   
Assumption no.5 is optional, but it is required to make valid conclusions about the population 
parameters, meaning the actual    from the sample parameters    estimated using a finite 
amount of data (Brooks, 2008). 
The error term               , were    is the ith observation of the dependent variable and 
         is the expected value of Y. The error term is a theoretical concept that cannot be 
observed, but the residual          , where    is the ith observed value, and     is the 
estimated value of the dependent variable   , is a real world value which is calculated for each 
observation every we run a regression. We can say that the residual is an estimate of the error 
term (Studenmund, 2011). 
The following models were used to identify the effect of capital structure on MFIs 
performance. Cost of funds and ROA were used as dependent variables, debt ratios as 
independent variables, and the variables; age of the firm, size of the firm, portfolio at risk, 
savings to assets, type of ownership and regional variables, were used as control variables. 
Because of the problem of multicollinearity the debt to equity ratio and the debt to asset ratio 
cannot be in the same regression model. Therefore we use different models, and use one as a 
robust for the other one.  
Multicollinearity refers to the relationship between the independent variables, and it appears 
when the independent variables are highly correlated (r = 0,9 and above) (Pallant, 2007). 
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The empirical multivariate regression models with six independent variables are stated as 
follows: 
Cost of funds: 
                                                         
                                                                                               (1) 
                                                          
                                                                                                (2) 
                                                          
                                                                                                (3)   
 
                                                         
                                                                                                (4) 
                                                          
                                                                                                (5) 
                                                          
                                                                                                (6) 
 
Return on Assets: 
                                                         
                                                                                                (7) 
                                                          
                                                                                                (8) 
                                                          
                                                                                                (9) 
 
                                                         
                                                                                                 (10) 
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                                                                                                 (11) 
                                                          
                                                                                                 (12) 
            
The above models test the following hypothesis: 
H0:      
H1:      
for             
 
4.4 Data analyzing tools 
SPSS and STATA were used to analyze the data. Both of these are well known statistical 
programs and a reliable tool for analyzing quantitative data.  
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5. DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
This chapter presents the data analysis and finding carried out to determine the effect of 
capital structure on the financial performance of MFIs. The chapter includes regression 
diagnostics, descriptive statistics and results of the regressions. 
5.1 Regression diagnostics 
Unusual and influential data 
The first part in the data screening process is to check for unusual and influential data. An 
observation is called influential if removing the observation will change the regression results 
substantially. This kind of data is called outliers and is observations where the dependent 
variable value is unusual given its value on the independent variables. Multiple regressions 
are very sensitive to outliers and can make a large difference in the regression analysis results. 
Outliers have large residuals (Brunin, 2006b; Pallant, 2007). 
There are many different methods for identifying unusual and influential data, in this study I 
use three different measures, taken from (Brunin, 2006b) and (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 
2003): 
 Leverage; an observation with an extreme value on a independent variable is called a 
point with high leverage. 
 Cook’s D combines information on the residual and leverage, and can be thought of as 
a general measure of influence 
 DFBETA is another type of influential measure, which is a deletion statistic that 
compares regression coefficients when case i is included versus not included in the 
sample. 
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Table 5-1: Critical values for unusual and influential data 
Measure Critical value 
Leverage           
Cook’s D      
Absolute (r-studentized)    
DFBETA       
k – number of predictors 
n – number of observations 
 
For the COF model (regression models number 1-6) I got maximum Cook’s D values from 
0,570 to 0,895 and maximum leverage values from 0,262 to 0,864. When I looked at the 
studentized residuals, leverage and Cook’s D for the COF models there were ten cases that 
was standing out as outliers, all of them with high values for two or more of this measures, 
this was case number 9, 83, 84, 111, 117, 160, 175, 191, 298 and 384. 
For the ROA model (regression models number 7-12) I got maximum Cook’s D values from 
0,309 to 1,351 and maximum leverage values from 0,290 to 0,842. When I looked at the 
studentized residuals, leverage and Cook’s D for the COF models there were five cases that 
was standing out as outliers, all of them with high values for two or more of this measures, 
this was case number 52, 90, 117, 169, 170, 191, 353 and 336. 
I also took the DFBETAs test on all the models, and I did not find any cases far below the 
critical values, so all of the cases above seem to be valid observations, but all of these cases 
make a large impact on the models, therefore I decided to exclude case number 9, 52, 83, 84, 
90, 111, 117, 160, 169, 170, 175, 191, 298, 336, 353 and 384 from the sample. As mentioned 
before I have already excluded case number 194 and 198, due to missing data, so the total 
number of cases used in this study will be 387. Without these values the critical values 
decreased substantially. Maximum Cook’s D values in the COF model went down to values 
between 0,065 and 0,213 and the maximum leverage values from 0,247 to 0,347. In the ROA 
model the maximum Cook’s D values went down to values between 0,070 and 0,159 and the 
maximum leverage values from 0,220 to 0,442. 
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Test of the classical assumptions 
As stated above, in order for the OLS estimators to be the best available, the classical 
assumptions must hold. Because of this, an important part of the regression analysis is to 
determine whether these assumptions hold for a particular equation, which I will test now for 
my models. If they do not hold, some assumptions has to be made (Brooks, 2008). 
The fist assumption states that the error term must have a zero mean. As we can see from 
table 5-2, the first assumption holds for all of the models. In fact, this assumption will never 
be violated if there is a constant term in the regression equation (Brooks, 2008). 
 
Table 5-2: Descriptive statistics for the models residuals 
Model/Residuals Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Diviation N 
COF (model 1) -0,094625 0,183233 0,000000 0,047781 343 
COF (model 2) -0,095478 0,183841 0,000000 0,047757 338 
COF (model 3) -0,093947 0,183629 0,000000 0,047855 336 
COF (model 4) -0,107063 0,187666 0,000000 0,046211 343 
COF (model 5) -0,095367 0,184604 0,000000 0,047765 339 
COF (model 6) -0,111363 0,180575 0,000000 0,045874 337 
ROA (model 7) -0,239242 0,211286 0,000000 0,060401 356 
ROA (model 8) -0,240678 0,210194 0,000000 0,060768 350 
ROA (model 9) -0,235859 0,210533 0,000000 0,060972 348 
ROA (model 10) -0,196158 0,211129 0,000000 0,057970 356 
ROA (model 11) -0,187152 0,215726 0,000000 0,059082 351 
ROA (model 12) -0,240727 0,209091 0,000000 0,060794 349 
 
Assumption two states that the error terms must have a constant variance, this means that 
there is no heteroskedasticity. According to (Studenmund, 2011) this assumption is likely to 
be violated in cross-sectional datasets, like the one used in this study. When heteroskedasticity 
is presence in a model, the conclusions could be misleading and unreliable (Brooks, 2008). 
 ne of the methods for testing if heteroskedasticity is presence in the model is White’s test 
for heteroskedasticity. The results from the White’s test are presented in Table 5-3. All of the 
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COF models have a p-value over 10 percent or 5 percent level, which indicates no significant 
heteroskedasticity. But as we can see from Table 5-3, all of the ROA models have p-values 
below 10 percent or 5 percent level, which indicates heteroskedasticity in all of these models 
(Brooks, 2008; Eikemo & Clausen, 2007).  
Table 5-3: White’s test for heteroskedasticity 
OLS Model p-value Significant heteroskedasticity 
COF (model 1) 0,3515 No 
COF (model 2) 0,4383 No 
COF (model 3) 0,2674 No 
COF (model 4) 0,6086 No 
COF (model 5) 0,2315 No 
COF (model 6) 0,4368 No 
ROA (model 7) 0,0002** Yes 
ROA (model 8) 0,0000** Yes 
ROA (model 9) 0,0103** Yes 
ROA (model 10) 0,0180** Yes 
ROA (model 11) 0,0017** Yes 
ROA (model 12) 0,0139 Yes 
** Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
As we can see from table 5-3, assumption number two, about no heteroskedasticity, is 
violated for all the ROA models, and therefore adjustments have to be made. 
To solve the problem of heteroskedasticity White developed an estimator for standard errors 
that is robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity. This technique works best in large 
samples. The effect of using the White-correction is that, if the variance of the errors is 
positively related to the square of an explanatory variable, the standard errors for the slope 
coefficients are increased relative to the usual OLS standard errors, which would make 
hypothesis testing more “conservative”, so that more evidence would be required against the 
null hypothesis before it would be rejected (Brooks, 2008). I ran regressions with robust 
standard errors for all ROA models in STATA. 
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The third assumption is that the error terms are linearly independent of one another, in other 
words this assumption requires no serial correlation (or autocorrelation). Serial correlation 
means correlation between values from the same variable between different units. Serial 
correlation can be examined by using the Durbin-Watson test. If the results of the Durbin-
Watson test are close to 2, serial correlation is not a problem(Eikemo & Clausen, 2007). As 
we can see from Table 5-4, all of the Durbin-Watson values lies close to 2, so there does not 
seem to be a problem with serial correlation, hence assumption three holds for the models. 
Table 5-4: Serial correlation, Durbin-Watson test 
OLS Model Durbin-Watson value 
COF (model 1) 1,825 
COF (model 2) 1,815 
COF (model 3) 1,832 
COF (model 4) 1,788 
COF (model 5) 1,792 
COF (model 6) 1,904 
ROA (model 7) 1,955 
ROA (model 8) 1,945 
ROA (model 9) 1,960 
ROA (model 10) 1,927 
ROA (model 11) 1,935 
ROA (model 12) 1,957 
Critical value: <1,0 or >3,0 
 
Assumption four states that there should be no relationship between the error term and 
corresponding explanatory variables. I have checked all of the explanatory variables and all of 
them are uncorrelated with the error term. The Pearson correlation coefficients were all equal 
to one and the Sig. 1-tailed correlations were all equal to zero. So assumption number four 
holds. 
The fifth assumption states that the error term has to be normally distributed. If the residuals 
have a strong deviation from normality, it will affect the hypothesis testing. But according to 
the central limit theorem, the sampling distribution of the mean of any random sample of 
observations will tend towards the normal distribution, as the sample size tends to infinity 
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(Brooks, 2008). So the we can argue that deviation from the normal distribution will not have 
large impact on the results of the hypothesis testing due to the large number of samples used 
in this study (Eikemo & Clausen, 2007). To identify any deviation from normality I used 
residual plots, skewness and kurtosis and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test. 
The distributions from the residuals from the COF model (Model 1) and the ROA model 
(model7) are presented in Figure 5-1 and 5-2 (the rest of the models are not represented here). 
All of the models tend towards the normal distribution, peak of the histogram lies around 
zero, but they look a bit sharper, and the tails are not quite equal. 
 
Figure 5-1: Distribution from the residuals from the COF model (Model 1) 
 
Figure 5-2: Distribution from the residuals from the ROA model (Model 7) 
 
43 
 
I also examined the skewness and kurtosis, skewness measures the extent to which a 
distribution is not symmetric about its mean value and kurtosis measures how fat the tails of 
the distribution are (Brooks, 2008). The result of the skewness and kurtosis are presented in 
table 5-5.  
Table 5-5: Skewness and kurtosis 
OLS Model Skewness Kurtosis 
COF (model 1) 0,634 0,636 
COF (model 2) 0,662 0,695 
COF (model 3) 0,657 0,651 
COF (model 4) 0,778 0,992 
COF (model 5) 0,682 0,712 
COF (model 6) 0,670 0,700 
ROA (model 7) -0,137 1,555 
ROA (model 8) -0,151 1,512 
ROA (model 9) -0,126 1,441 
ROA (model 10) -0,039 1,348 
ROA (model 11) -0,098 1,143 
ROA (model 12) -0,122 1,539 
 
Positive skewness values indicate that the scores are clustered to the left, at the low end of the 
graph. While negative skewness values indicate a clustering of scores to the right, at the high 
end of the graph (Pallant, 2007). As we can see from Table 5-5, all of the COF models have a 
small skewness to the left and kurtosis, and the ROA models have small skewness to the right 
and moderate kurtosis. To test whether or not the models have a normal distribution I 
performed the Kolmogorv-Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk tests on all of the models. We can 
see that all of the values in Table 5-6 for the Kolmogorv-Smirnov test is higher than 0,05 so 
we can not reject the hypothesis that the residuals are normal distributed at a 5 percent 
significance level. The values in the Shapiro-Wilk test lies between zero and one, where 
values close to one indicates normality of the data (Razali & Wah, 2011). As we can see all of 
the values from the Shapiro-Wilk test lies close to one, which indicates normality. This means 
that assumption number five holds. 
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Table 5-6: Kolmogorv-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test 
OLS Model Kolmogorv-Smirnov p-value Shapiro-Wilk p-value 
COF (model 1) 0,067 0,975 
COF (model 2) 0,060 0,973 
COF (model 3) 0,056 0,973 
COF (model 4) 0,055 0,967 
COF (model 5) 0,062 0,972 
COF (model 6) 0,056 0,973 
ROA (model 7) 0,066 0,979 
ROA (model 8) 0,066 0,979 
ROA (model 9) 0,065 0,980 
ROA (model 10) 0,060 0,982 
ROA (model 11) 0,058 0,983 
ROA (model 12) 0,068 0,979 
Reject if  p<0,05  
 
I have also tested the models for multicollinearity, which means correlation between 
explanatory variables. The term collinearity implies that two variables are close to being 
perfect linear combinations of one another. If there are more than two variables involved in 
this it is often called multicollinearity (Brunin, 2006a). When the problem of multicollinearity 
get large, it will be difficult to distinguish between the effects of the different variables. It will 
also lead to inaccurate estimates and the significance values will get large (Eikemo & 
Clausen, 2007). I checked the Pearson correlation, which varies between -1 and 1, if the p-
value is 0, there is no linear correlation, and if the p-value is -1 or 1 we have a perfectly 
negative or positive relationship between the variables. According to Eikemo & Clausen 
(2007) values over 0,8 for the Pearson correlation should be taken a closer look at. I also 
checked the VIF (Variance inflating factor) and the tolerance. Tolerance is an indicator of 
how much of the variability of the specified explanatory variable that is not explained by the 
other explanatory variables in the model, if this value is very small (less than 0,1), it indicates 
that the multiple correlation with the other variables is high and suggesting that there is a 
possibility of multicollinearity.  Tolerance is calculated using the formula 1-R squared for 
each variable. VIF is the inverse of the Tolerance value, 1 divided by Tolerance. Values over 
10 for the VIF values would be a concern here, indicating multicollinearity (Pallant, 2007).  
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I have checked all of my twelve models, and all of the correlation values are far below the 
critical values, so there is no need to worry about multicollinearity affecting the data.  
Diagnostics summary 
I have excluded 2 of the 405 cases because of missing data, and also 16 cases due to 
influential data, so the total number of cases in this analysis is 387. To deal with the problem 
of heteroskedasticity in the ROA models (model 7-12), I performed a robust regression 
analysis which are presented in table 5-20 to 5-23. 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5-7 presents the descriptive statistics from the dependent, explanatory and the control 
variables used in the following analysis. The statistics which are presented in this table are 
after removal of unusual and influential data. 
As we can see from Table 5-7, all of the variables have a solid sample size, and the share of 
missing data is ranging from 0-6 percent, where COF have the most missing data. 
 
Table 5-7: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.Deviation 
COF 363 0,000 0,240 0,07386 0,050784 
ROA 375 -0,250 0,270 0,03552 0,067068 
DE 382 -57,60 99,75 4,2944 12,34635 
LDE 376 -45,36 99,37 2,5075 10,44140 
SDE 374 -27,89 59,10 1,8605 5,07890 
DA 382 0,00 1,40 0,5378 0,28697 
SDA 375 0,00 1,37 0,3143 0,26288 
LDA 377 -0,37 1,21 0,3315 0,28651 
PaR 374 0,00 0,680 0,05751 0,079171 
Age 384 1 43 10,7734 6,62129 
SA 376 0,00 1,14 0,1165 0,22939 
Size 383 11,69 19,33 15,1921 1,29647 
Bank 387 0 1 0,05 0,227 
NGO 387 0 1 0,50 0,501 
46 
 
EECA 387 0 1 0,18 0,385 
MENA 387 0 1 0,04 0,193 
Asia 387 0 1 0,16 0,365 
LA 387 0 1 0,38 0,485 
Africa 387 0 1 0,25 0,431 
 
 
 
Figure 5-3: Frequency of the cost of funds 
 
 
Cost of funds 
The cost of funds ratio measures the average cost of the MFIs borrowed funds. The mean 
value of cost of funds is 0,07386 which indicates approximately 7,4 percent, this number is 
greater than the mean value of ROA of approximately 3,5 percent, this is not a good sign, 
since it means that the MFIs have to spend more to earn less.  
 
Figure 5-4: Frequency of the Return on Assets 
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Return on Assets 
The mean value of ROA is slightly positive, at approximately 3,55 percent (0,03552). Which 
according to Mersland, Randøy & Strøm (2011) this reflects that a large number of the MFIs 
are not self-sufficient and they do not pay their true cost of capital (Mersland, Randøy, & 
Strøm, 2011). The minimum value of ROA is -0,250, which is an indication of unprofitable 
MFIs. 
Figure 5-5: Frequency of the DE, LDE and SDE 
    
 
Debt to Equity, Long Term Debt to Equity and Short Term Debt to Equity 
The mean value of debt to assets ratio is 4,2944 which indicates that most of the MFIs are 
highly leveraged, they use approximately four times more debt financing than equity. The 
minimum value of debt to equity is -57,60, maximum value is 99,75 and a standard deviation 
of 12,34635, this shows that there is a huge variation in the MFIs sector regarding leverage, 
which we also can see if we look at the histogram in Figure 5-5. Long term debt to equity has 
a mean value of 2,5075, and the mean value of short term debt to equity is 1,8605 this 
indicates that the MFIs depends more on long term debt than on short term debt. When 
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summing up, all of these values mean that MFIs depends severely more on debt financing 
than on equity financing. 
Figure 5-6: Frequency of the DA, LDA and SDA 
 
 
Debt to Assets, Long Term Debt to Assets and Short Term Debt to Assets 
The mean value of debt to asset is 0,5378 which indicates that approximately 54 percent of 
the total assets is financed by debt, this means that the MFIs depends largely on debt 
financing. The minimum value of debt to assets is 0,00 and the maximum value is 1,40, while 
the standard deviation is 0,28697, which indicates that there is a spread within the MFI sector 
when it comes to the levels of leverage, this can also be shown in Figure 5-6. Long term debt 
do assets and short term debt to assets seems to be quite evenly distributed, with mean values 
of 0,3315 and 0,3143. 
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Figure 5-7: Frequency of the Portfolio at Risk. 
 
Portfolio at Risk 
The mean value of portfolio at risk is 0,05751, which indicates that approximately 5,8 percent 
of the MFIs loan portfolio that are 30 days or more overdue. The older delinquency is, the less 
likely it is that the loan will be repaid. Any portfolio at risk (PaR30) exceeding 10 percent 
should be cause for concern, because unlike commercial loans, most of the MFIs are not 
backed by bankable collateral (MicroRate & InterAmericanDevelopmentBank, 2003). 
Figure 5-8: Frequency of the MFIs age 
 
Age 
The mean value of the age variable is 10,7734 which indicates that most of the MFIs are well 
established. The youngest of the MFIs in this study are 1 year, while the oldest are 43 years, 
so there is quite a spread in the age. The distribution for the age variable is shown in Figure 5-
8, and we can see that it is tailed to the right. 
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Figure 5-9: Frequency of the Savings to Asset ratio 
 
Savings to Assets 
The mean value of the savings to assets ratio is 0,1165 indicating that approximately 11,65 
percent of the MFIs assets are financed by savings. The minimum value is 0, and the 
maximum value is 1,4 so there is quite a spread amongst the MFIs in weather they offer 
savings or not. From the histogram in Figure 5-9 we can see that the most frequent value is 
0,00. 
Figure 5-10: Frequency of the MFIs size 
 
Size 
The variable size is computed by taking the logarithm of assets. There is a wide spread in size 
within the MFIs included in this study. The smallest MFI has 119.750,00 USD in total assets, 
while the largest MFI in this study has a total of 248.115.376,00 USD in total assets. So as we 
can see this study includes both small scale MFIs and multimillion dollar MFIs. 
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Type of ownership of MFIs 
There are different types of ownership of the MFIs included in this study, and as we can see 
from Table 5-7, 5 percent of the MFIs are banks, but the majority of them, a total of 50 
percent, are NGOs. 
Regional control variables 
As we can see from the descriptive statistics, the MFIs are located indifferent regions, this has 
already been presented in Figure 3-1. There are some small deviations between the numbers 
in the descriptive statistics and Figure 3-1, because of the exclusion of some cases due to 
unusual and influential data. 
 
5.3 Regression results  
In this section I will present the results and discussion of the regression analyzes. I have 
earlier presented hypotheses about the effect of capital structure on MFIs performance, and 
now it is time to confirm or reject the hypotheses. The regression analyses were carried out to 
determine the relationship between capital structure and performance of MFIs. Measures of 
performance, cost of funds and ROA, were regressed against different measures of capital 
structure. 
The null hypothesis is usually rejected if the test is statistically significant at the chosen 
significance level. But there are two types of error that can be made when using hypothesis 
tests: 
1. Rejecting H0 when it actually was true; this is called a type I error. 
2. Not rejecting H0 when it actually was false; this is called a type II error. 
(Brooks, 2008, p. 64) 
The probability of a type I error is equal to the significance level, so in this study there is a 10 
percent chance of making a type I error. We could reduce this percent by choosing a 5 percent 
significance level, but that would also reduce the probability that the null hypothesis would be 
rejected, hence increasing the probability of a type II error (Brooks, 2008).  
Before I present the result of the regressions a significance level has to be chosen. 
Studenmund (2011) recommends using a 5 percent significance level, but he also states that it 
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makes sense to use a 10 percent level when the risk of type II errors are high. In this study I 
have used both 5 and 10 percent significance levels, but with a main focus on the 5 percent 
level. 
If the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10 or 5 percent level, we can say that the result of the 
regression is statistically significant. But on the other hand if the null hypothesis is not 
rejected, we can say that the regression is not significant, or that it is insignificant (Brooks, 
2008). 
The marginal significance level is listed in the tables of the regressions as the p-value. A p-
value for a t-score is the probability of observing the t-value in that size or larger, if the null 
hypothesis were true. I have also included the t-values in the tables of the regressions, but I 
will mainly emphasize in the p-values. Because the p-value is a probability, it ranges between 
0 and 1. This value tells us the lowest level of significance at which we can reject the null 
hypothesis. Small p-values casts doubt on the null hypothesis, so in order to reject a null 
hypothesis, we need a low p-value (Studenmund, 2011).  The decision rule used in the 
following regression analysis is stated below. 
Decision rule: 
If p > 0,10     Reject H0 
If  < 0,10       Do not reject H0 
I have also performed F-testes, which provides a formal hypotheses test of the overall fit of 
the models. The F-test tests the hypothesis that the predicted values show no relationship to 
the dependent value. A low significance value in the F-test indicates that we have a good 
model fit (Studenmund, 2011). 
As explained above, the F-test measures the overall fit of the model, but the simplest and most 
commonly used measure of fit is R
2
. This is a measure of the overall fit, and tells us how 
much of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the model. R
2
 must lie in the 
interval between 0 and 1. A value close to 1 show an excellent overall fit and indicates that 
the model explains almost all of the variance in the dependent variable. A value close to 0 
indicates that the model is not a very god fit for the data. The goodness of fit is relative to the 
topic of the study. In cross sectional data, like in this study, the R
2
s are often low because the 
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observations differ in ways that is not easily quantified. It is important to know that a high 
value of R
2
 does not necessarily indicate a good model. 
 One problem with R
2
 is that adding another independent variable to the model can never 
decrease R
2
. To compensate for this there is made a modification to R
2
, which is called 
adjusted R
2
. Pallant (2007) states that if the sample is small it we should consider reporting 
the adjusted R
2
 rather than the normal R
2
 (Pallant, 2007; Studenmund, 2011). In this study 
there was not much difference between adjusted R
2
 and R
2
, so I will focus on R
2
. 
Regression model 1, 2 and 3 
The regression using cost of funds (COF) as the dependent variable as a measure of 
performance of MFIs and debt to equity (DE), long term debt to equity (LDE) and short term 
debt to equity (SDE) as a measure of capital structure is presented in Tables 5-8, 5-9 and 5-10. 
The F- test indicates that the models are good fits. Note that only 11,4 percent (R
2
 = 0,114 in 
Model 1), 11,2 percent (R
2
 = 0,112 in Model 2) and 11,5 percent (R
2
 = 0,115 in Model 3) of 
the cost of funds ratio is explained by the explanatory variables in the model. The regression 
models shows that all of the capital structure measures DE, LDE and SDE does not have a 
significantly impact on cost of funds of MFIs. We can also observe that some of the control 
variables, portfolio at risk, age of MFIs, size of MIFs, type of MFI (bank and NGO) and 
MENA, does not have any statistically significant effect in any of the models.The models 
further reveals that the savings to assets ratio and the three regional variables EECA, Asia and 
LA does have a significantly affect to the cost of funds of MFIs. 
In Model 1 where debt to equity is the explanatory variable, the savings to assets ratio has a 5 
percent significantly negative effect on cost of funds, indicating that cost of funds will 
decrease by -0,041 due to a marginal increase in savings to assets, holding all the other 
variables constant. The three regional dummy variables EECA, Asia and LA have a positively 
significant effect at a 5 percent level to the cost of fund ratio. 
In Model 2 where long term debt to equity is used as explanatory variable for capital 
structure, I also found that the savings to assets ratio has a 5 percent significantly negative 
effect on cost of funds, indicating that cost of funds will decrease by -0,039 due to a marginal 
increase in savings to assets, holding all the other variables constant. The regional dummy 
variables EECA, Asia and LA also have a positively significant effect at a 5 percent level to 
the cost of fund ratio. 
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Model 3 where short term debt to equity was applied as explanatory variable I found the same 
result as in the two previous models, savings to assets ratio has a 5 percent significantly 
negative effect on cost of funds, indicating that cost of funds will decrease by -0,044 due to a 
marginal increase in savings to assets, holding all the other variables constant. And the 
regional dummy variables EECA, Asia and LA have a positively significant effect at a 5 
percent level to the cost of fund ratio. 
Table 5-8: Model 1: Regression result from the COF Model 
Xk    SE(     Standardized     t-value p-value 
(constant) 0,030 0,035  0,882 0,379 
DE 5,249E-5 0,000 0,011 0,215 0,830 
PaR 0,008 0,037 0,012 0,204 0,838 
Age 0,000 0,000 -0,046 -0,785 0,433 
SA -0,041 0,015 -0,179 -2,772 0,006** 
Size 0,002 0,002 0,056 0,957 0,339 
Bank -0,011 0,012 -0,052 -0,907 0,365 
NGO -0,010 0,006 -0,100 -1,618 0,107 
EECA 0,031 0,009 0,233 3,487 0,001** 
MENA 0,015 0,014 0,059 1,012 0,312 
Asia 0,032 0,010 0,216 3,322 0,001** 
LA 0,033 0,007 0,317 4,374 0,000** 
Dependent variable: COF 
R
2
: 0,114 
F-test: 0,000 
N: 343 
**Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
Table 5-9: Model 2: Regression result from the COF Model 
Xk    SE(     Standardized     t-value p-value 
(constant) 0,031 0,034  0,912 0,362 
LDE -7,126E-5 0,000 -0,013 -0,243 0,808 
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PaR 0,004 0,037 0,006 0,102 0,918 
Age 0,000 0,000 -0,049 -0,832 0,406 
SA -0,039 0,015 -0,173 -2,670 0,008** 
Size 0,002 0,002 0,055 0,935 0,351 
Bank -0,011 0,012 -0,051 -0,887 0,376 
NGO -0,010 0,006 -0,102 -1,641 0,102 
EECA 0,030 0,009 0,229 3,425 0,001** 
MENA 0,015 0,014 0,061 1,040 0,299 
Asia 0,033 0,010 0,226 3,436 0,001** 
LA 0,032 0,007 0,315 4,358 0,000** 
Dependent variable: COF 
R
2
: 0,112 
F-test: 0,000 
N: 338 
**Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 5-10: Model 3: Regression result from the COF Model 
Xk    SE(     Standardized     t-value p-value 
(constant) 0,029 0,035  0,841 0,401 
SDE 0,001 0,001 0,076 1,343 0,180 
PaR 0,007 0,038 0,010 0,176 0,861 
Age 0,000 0,000 -0,040 -0,667 0,505 
SA -0,044 0,15 -0,195 -2,916 0,004** 
Size 0,002 0,002 0,056 0,951 0,342 
Bank -0,012 0,012 -0,056 -0,968 0,334 
NGO -0,009 0,006 -0,088 -1,411 0,159 
EECA 0,029 0,009 0,223 3,323 0,001** 
MENA 0,015 0,015 0,060 1,017 0,310 
Asia 0,032 0,009 0,218 3,392 0,001** 
LA 0,031 0,008 0,304 4,186 0,000** 
Dependent variable: COF 
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R
2
: 0,115 
F-test: 0,000 
N: 336 
**Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
Regression model 4, 5 and 6 
The regression using cost of funds (COF) as the dependent variable as a measure of 
performance of MFIs and debt to assets (DA), long term debt to assets (LDA) and short term 
debt to assets (SDA) as a measure of capital structure is presented in Tables 5-11, 5-12 and 5-
13. The F- test indicates that the models are good fits. The control variables portfolio at risk, 
age of MFIs, size of MIFs, type of MFI (bank and NGO) and MENA does not have any 
statistically significant effect in any of the models. 
 
Regression Model 4, which considered the debt to assets ratio as the explanatory variable, has 
an R
2
 of 0,167, this indicates that 16,7 percent of the cost of funds ratio is explained by the 
explanatory variables in the model. This model reveals a very significant relationship 
between the debt to assets ratio and the cost of funds, with a p-value lower than 0,001. There 
is in other words a 99,9 percent chance that debt to assets has an effect on the overall MFIs 
performance. A    value of 0,052 indicates that the cost of funds ratio increases with 0,052 
with a marginal increase in debt to assets. We can also see that this is supported by a low 
standard error (0,011) and it also has the largest standardized     coefficient (0,290) in the 
model, which means that debt to assets makes the strongest unique contribution to explaining 
the cost of funds, when the variance explained by all other variables in the model is 
controlled for. I also found the regional dummy variables EECA, Asia and LA to have a 
significantly positive effect on the performance, measured by cost of funds. 
 
In Model 5 long term debt to assets ratio was applied as a measure of capital structure of the 
MFIs. The R
2
 of 0,113 indicates that 11,3 percent of the cost of funds ratio is explained by the 
explanatory variables in the model. Long term debt to assets has a slightly positive, but not 
significant effect on the MFIs performance, measured by cost of funds. The savings to assets 
have a significantly negative effect on the cost of funds, it has a    value of -0,038 which 
indicates that the cost of funds ratio decreases with 0,038 with a marginal increase in the 
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savings to assets ratio. Also in this model I found the regional dummy variables EECA, Asia 
and LA to have a significantly positive effect on the performance, measured by cost of funds. 
 
Model 6 shows the regression results using cost of funds ratio as the dependent variable 
measuring overall performance and short term debt to assets as the explanatory variable 
measuring capital structure. The R
2
 of 0,187 indicates that 18,7 percent of the cost of funds 
ratio is explained by the explanatory variables in the regression model. Short term debt to 
assets is very significant with a p-value lower than 0,001. This is also supported by a high t-
value (5,462) and the standardized     coefficient (0,385) indicates a strong impact on the cost 
of fund ratio.  The    value of 0,078 indicates that the cost of funds ratio increases with 0,078 
with a marginal increase in short term debt to assets. Savings to assets also have a very 
significant p-value lower than 0,001. The    value for the savings to assets ratio of -0,089 
indicates that the cost of funds ratio decreases with -0,098 with a marginal increase in the 
savings to assets ratio. This model also shows that the regional dummy variables EECA, Asia 
and LA with a p-value lower than 0,001 has a very significantly positive effect on the 
performance, measured by cost of funds. The regional dummy variable MENA is also having 
a positively significant effect at a 10 percent level to the cost of fund ratio. 
 
Table 5-11: Model 4: Regression result from the COF Model 
Xk    SE(     Standardized     t-value p-value 
(constant) 0,001 0,034  0,036 0,971 
DA 0,052 0,011 0,290 4,647 0,000** 
PaR 0,008 0,036 0,013 0,231 0,817 
Age 0,000 0,000 -0,023 -0,401 0,689 
SA -0,011 0,015 -0,049 -0,715 0,475 
Size 0,002 0,002 0,054 0,957 0,339 
Bank -0,011 0,012 -0,052 -0,944 0,346 
NGO -0,009 0,006 -0,085 -1,421 0,156 
EECA 0,032 0,009 0,239 3,703 0,000** 
MENA 0,023 0,014 0,092 1,607 0,109 
Asia 0,017 0,010 0,120 1,823 0,069* 
LA 0,028 0,007 0,276 3,917 0,000** 
Dependent variable: COF 
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R
2
: 0,167  
F-test: 0,000 
N: 343 
**Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 5-12: Model 5: Regression result from the COF Model 
Xk    SE(     Standardized     t-value p-value 
(constant) 0,027 0,035  0,782 0,435 
LDA 0,007 0,012 0,039 0,597 0,551 
PaR 0,005 0,037 0,008 0,140 0,889 
Age 0,000 0,000 -0,046 -0,778 0,437 
SA -0,038 0,015 -0,167 -2,528 0,012** 
Size 0,002 0,002 0,059 1,006 0,315 
Bank -0,011 0,012 -0,051 -0,892 0,373 
NGO -0,010 0,006 -0,101 -1,619 0,106 
EECA 0,030 0,009 0,224 3,338 0,001** 
MENA 0,015 0,014 0,061 1,034 0,302 
Asia 0,029 0,011 0,200 2,704 0,007** 
LA 0,032 0,008 0,307 4,165 0,000** 
Dependent variable: COF 
R
2
: 0,113 
F-test: 0,000 
N: 339 
**Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 5-13: Model 6: Regression result from the COF Model 
Xk    SE(     Standardized     t-value p-value 
(constant) 0,016 0,033  0,495 0,621 
SDA 0,078 0,014 0,385 5,462 0,000** 
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PaR 0,029 0,036 0,044 0,810 0,419 
Age 0,000 0,000 -0,042 -0,739 0,460 
SA -0,089 0,017 -0,394 -5,330 0,000** 
Size 0,001 0,002 0,034 0,600 0,549 
Bank -0,012 0,012 -0,056 -1,019 0,309 
NGO -0,006 0,006 -0,063 -1,056 0,292 
EECA 0,039 0,009 0,293 4,496 0,000** 
MENA 0,026 0,014 0,105 1,849 0,065* 
Asia 0,044 0,009 0,300 4,746 0,000** 
LA 0,037 0,007 0,362 5,186 0,000** 
Dependent variable: COF 
R
2
: 0,187  
F-test: 0,000 
N: 337 
**Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
Regression model 7, 8 and 9 
The regression using return of assets (ROA) as the dependent variable as a measure of 
performance of MFIs and debt to equity (DE), long term debt to equity (LDE) and short term 
debt to equity (SDE) as a measure of capital structure is presented in Tables 5-14, 5-15 and 5-
16. The F- tests with p-values of 0,000 indicates that the models are good fits. The control 
variables age of  MFIs, savings to assets, type of MFI (bank and NGO) and Asia does not 
have any statistically significant effect in any of the models. 
 
Model 7 shows the regression results using debt to equity as the explanatory variable as a 
measure of the capital structure of MFIs. The R
2
 of 0,204 indicates that 20,4 percent of the 
return on assets is explained by the explanatory variables in the model. The debt to equity 
ratio has a p-value of 0,466 which means that this variable does not have any statistically 
significant effect on the performance in this model. Portfolio at risk (PaR) has a negatively 
significant effect on return on assets at a 5 percent level, indicating that return on assets will 
decrease by -0,156 due to a marginal increase in portfolio at risk. Size of MFIs has a 5 
percent statistically significant positive effect on the performance, measured by return on 
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assets. The    value for the size of MFIs of 0,009 indicates that the return on assets ratio 
increases with 0,009 with a marginal increase in MFIs size. This model also shows that the 
regional dummy variables EECA, MENA and LA with have significantly positive effect on 
the performance, measured by return on assets. 
 
Model 8 considered the long term debt to equity as a measure of MFIs capital structure. The 
models R
2
 of 0,209 indicates that 20,9 percent of the return on assets is explained by the 
explanatory variables in the model. The long term debt to equity ratio has a p-value of 0,313 
which indicates that this variable does not have any statistically significant effect on the 
performance in this model. The portfolio at risk is statically significant at a 5 percent level, 
hence the p-value is 0,001, and the    value for portfolio at risk of -0,157 indicates that the 
return on assets ratio decreases with -0,157 with a marginal increase in portfolio at risk. The 
size of MFIs also have a statically significant effect on the performance at a 5 percent level. 
The    value MFIs size of 0,009 indicates that the return on assets ratio increases with 0,009 
with a marginal increase in MFIs size. The regional dummy variables EECA, MENA and LA 
also have significantly positive effect on the performance, measured by return on assets. 
 
In Model 9 short term debt to equity was applied as a measure of capital structure of the 
MFIs. The models R
2
 of 0,206 indicates that 20,6 percent of the return on assets is explained 
by the explanatory variables in the model. The short term debt to equity ratio has a p-value of 
0,953 which indicates that this variable does not have any statistically significant effect on the 
performance in this model. Portfolio at risk on the other hand has a p-value of 0,001 that 
indicates significance at a 5 percent level. The    value for portfolio at risk is -0,155 which 
indicates that the return on assets ratio decreases with -0,155 with a marginal increase in 
portfolio at risk. Size of MFIs has a slightly positive statically significant effect on the 
performance at a 5 percent level. The    value MFIs size of 0,009 indicates that the return on 
assets ratio increases with 0,009 with a marginal increase in MFIs size. We can also see that 
the regional dummy variables EECA, MENA and LA have significantly positive effect on the 
performance, measured by return on assets. 
 
Table 5-14: Model 7: Regression result from the ROA Model 
Xk    SE(     Standardized     t-value p-value 
(constant) -0,126 0,044  -2,889 0,004** 
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DE -2,347E-4 0,000 -0,036 -0,730 0,466 
PaR -0,156 0,045 -0,180 -3,441 0,001** 
Age 0,000 0,001 -0,027 -0,494 0,622 
SA -0,004 0,018 -0,013 -0,214 0,830 
Size 0,009 0,003 0,167 3,096 0,002** 
Bank 0,019 0,015 0,065 1,234 0,218 
NGO 0,009 0,008 0,068 1,180 0,239 
EECA 0,048 0,011 0,277 4,440 0,000** 
MENA 0,063 0,018 0,187 3,459 0,001** 
Asia 0,012 0,012 0,065 1,066 0,287 
LA 0,047 0,009 0,341 5,045 0,000** 
Dependent variable: ROA 
R
2
: 0,204 
F-test: 0,000 
N: 356 
**Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 5-15: Model 8: Regression result from the ROA Model 
Xk    SE(     Standardized     t-value p-value 
(constant) -0,130 0,044  -2,970 0,003** 
LDE -4,372E-4 0,000 -0,050 -1,011 0,313 
PaR -0,157 0,046 -0,180 -3,430 0,001** 
Age 0,000 0,001 -0,025 -0,454 0,650 
SA -0,005 0,018 -0,018 -0,299 0,765 
Size 0,009 0,003 0,171 3,150 0,002** 
Bank 0,019 0,016 0,065 1,222 0,223 
NGO 0,010 0,008 0,075 1,302 0,194 
EECA 0,048 0,011 0,273 4,381 0,000** 
MENA 0,063 0,018 0,186 3,415 0,001** 
Asia 0,013 0,012 0,068 1,119 0,264 
LA 0,048 0,009 0,343 5,112 0,000** 
62 
 
Dependent variable: ROA 
R
2
: 0,209 
F-test: 0,000 
N: 350 
**Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 5-16: Model 9: Regression result from the ROA Model 
Xk    SE(     Standardized     t-value p-value 
(constant) -0,126 0,044  -2,859 0,005** 
SDE -4,087E-5 0,001 -0,003 -0,059 0,953 
PaR -0,155 0,046 -0,178 -3,375 0,001** 
Age 0,000 0,001 -0,026 -0,464 0,643 
SA -0,005 0,019 -0,015 -0,240 0,810 
Size 0,009 0,003 0,166 3,040 0,003** 
Bank 0,020 0,016 0,067 1,256 0,210 
NGO 0,010 0,008 0,074 1,284 0,200 
EECA 0,048 0,011 0,271 4,325 0,000** 
MENA 0,063 0,018 0,188 3,430 0,001** 
Asia 0,010 0,012 0,052 0,869 0,385 
LA 0,047 0,009 0,340 5,043 0,000** 
Dependent variable: ROA 
R
2
: 0,206 
F-test: 0,000 
N: 348 
**Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
Regression model 10, 11 and 12 
The regression using return of assets (ROA) as the dependent variable as a measure of 
performance of MFIs and debt to assets (DA), long term debt to assets (LDA) and short term 
debt to assets (SDA) as a measure of capital structure is presented in Tables 5-17, 5-18 and 5-
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19. The F- tests with p-values of 0,000 indicates that the models are good fits. The control 
variables age of MFIs and type of MFI (bank and NGO) does not have any statistically 
significant effect in any of the models. 
 
Model 10 shows the regression results using return on assets as the dependent variable 
measuring overall performance and debt to assets as the explanatory variable measuring 
capital structure. The R
2
 of 0,268 indicates that 26,8 percent of the return on assets ratio is 
explained by the explanatory variables in the regression model. Debt to assets is very 
significant with a p-value lower than 0,001. This is also supported by a high t-value (-5,467) 
and the standardized     coefficient (-0,307) indicates a strong impact on the return on assets 
ratio.  The    value of -0,073 indicates that the return on assets ratio decreases with -0,073 
with a marginal increase in debt to assets. Portfolio at risk also have a very significant p-value 
lower than 0,001. The    value for the portfolio at risk of -0,155 indicates that the return on 
assets ratio decreases with -0,155 with a marginal increase in the portfolio at risk. Savings to 
assets are statistically significant at a 5 percent level, with a    value of -0,048 which indicates 
that the return on assets ratio decreases with -0,048 with a marginal increase in the savings to 
asset ratio. The size of MFIs has a positive effect on return on assets, with a     value of 0,010 
which indicates that the return on assets ratio increases with 0,010 with a marginal increase in 
MFIs size. All of the regional dummy variables EECA, MENA, Asia and LA also have 
significantly positive effect on the performance, measured by return on assets. 
 
Model 11 presents the regression results using return on assets as the dependent variable 
measuring overall performance and long term debt to assets as the explanatory variable 
measuring capital structure. The R
2
 of 0,250 indicates that 25 percent of the return on assets 
ratio is explained by the explanatory variables in the regression model. From the model we 
can see that long term debt to assets is very significant with a p-value lower than 0,001. This 
is also supported by a high t-value (-4,439) and the standardized     coefficient (-0,249) 
indicates a strong impact on the return on assets ratio.  The    value of -0,061 indicates that 
the return on assets ratio decreases with -0,061 with a marginal increase in long term debt to 
assets. Portfolio at risk has a negatively significant effect on return on assets at a 5 percent 
level. The    value for the portfolio at risk of -0,145 indicates that the return on assets ratio 
decreases with -0,145 with a marginal increase in the portfolio at risk. Savings to assets has a 
negative effect on return on assets, but has a p-value of 0,190 and is therefore not statistically 
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significant. The size of MFIs has a slightly positive effect on return on assets, with a     value 
of 0,009 which indicates that the return on assets ratio increases with 0,009 with a marginal 
increase in MFIs size. Also in this model all of the regional dummy variables EECA, MENA, 
Asia and LA have significantly positive effect on the performance, measured by return on 
assets. 
 
Model 12 shows the regression results using return on assets as the dependent variable 
measuring overall performance and short term debt to assets as the explanatory variable 
measuring capital structure. The R
2
 of 0,209 indicates that 20,9 percent of the return on assets 
ratio is explained by the explanatory variables in the regression model. Short term debt to 
assets has a negative effect on return on assets, but has a p-value of 0,310 and hence it is not 
statistically significant. Portfolio at risk is statistically significant at a 5 percent level. The    
value for the portfolio at risk of -0,161 indicates that the return on assets ratio decreases with 
-0,161 with a marginal increase in the portfolio at risk. Savings to assets has a p-value of 
0,733 and is therefore not statistically significant. The size of MFIs has a positive effect on 
return on assets, with a     value of 0,009 which indicates that the return on assets ratio 
increases with 0,009 with a marginal increase in MFIs size. The regional dummy variables 
EECA, MENA and LA also have significantly positive effect on the performance, measured 
by return on assets. 
 
Table 5-17: Model 10: Regression result from the ROA Model 
Xk    SE(     Standardized     t-value p-value 
(constant) -0,093 0,042  -2,208 0,028** 
DA -0,073 0,013 -0,307 -5,467 0,000** 
PaR -0,155 0,044 -0,178 -3,566 0,000** 
Age 0,000 0,001 -0,044 -0,849 0,397 
SA -0,048 0,019 -0,159 -2,509 0,013** 
Size 0,010 0,003 0,178 3,454 0,001** 
Bank 0,020 0,015 0,068 1,336 0,182 
NGO 0,008 0,007 0,056 1,018 0,310 
EECA 0,044 0,010 0,253 4,247 0,000** 
MENA 0,051 0,018 0,152 2,900 0,004** 
Asia 0,028 0,011 0,147 2,478 0,014** 
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LA  0,052 0,009 0,375 5,786 0,000** 
Dependent variable: ROA 
R
2
: 0,268 
F-test: 0,000 
N: 356 
**Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
Table 5-18: Model 11: Regression result from the ROA Model 
Xk    SE(     Standardized     t-value p-value 
(constant) -0,109 0,043  -2,554 0,011** 
LDA -0,061 0,014 -0,249 -4,439 0,000** 
PaR -0,145 0,045 -0,166 -3,250 0,001** 
Age 0,000 0,001 -0,027 -0,505 0,614 
SA -0,024 0,018 -0,079 -1,314 0,190 
Size 0,009 0,003 0,163 3,090 0,002** 
Bank 0,020 0,015 0,068 1,319 0,188 
NGO 0,011 0,008 0,079 1,415 0,158 
EECA 0,052 0,011 0,294 4,830 0,000** 
MENA 0,061 0,018 0,182 3,438 0,001** 
Asia 0,034 0,012 0,179 2,777 0,006** 
LA 0,054 0,009 0,390 5,885 0,000** 
Dependent variable: ROA 
R
2
: 0,250 
F-test: 0,000 
N: 351 
**Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 5-19: Model 12: Regression result from the ROA Model 
Xk    SE(     Standardized     t-value p-value 
(constant) -0,122 0,044  -2,783 0,006** 
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SDA -0,018 0,018 -0,069 -1,017 0,310 
PaR -0,161 0,046 -0,184 -3,485 0,001** 
Age 0,000 0,001 -0,025 -0,460 0,646 
SA 0,007 0,022 0,024 0,341 0,733 
Size 0,009 0,003 0,169 3,104 0,002** 
Bank 0,020 0,016 0,068 1,274 0,203 
NGO 0,009 0,008 0,070 1,204 0,230 
EECA 0,045 0,011 0,259 4,072 0,000** 
MENA 0,060 0,019 0,180 3,265 0,001** 
Asia 0,007 0,012 0,038 0,623 0,534 
LA 0,046 0,009 0,331 4,904 0,000** 
Dependent variable:  ROA 
R
2
: 0,209 
F-test: 0,000 
N: 349 
**Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
5.4 Robustness regressions 
Table 5-20, 5-21, 5-22 and 5-23 presents the results of the robustness regressions. I found that 
the results are consistent with the original OLS regressions, with a few exceptions; 
In the robustness regressions for Model 1,2 and 5 I found the results to be consistent with the 
OLS regressions, but in addition I found that organization type dummy variable NGO has a 
statistically negatively significance at a 10 percent level to cost of funds 
I found that short term debt to equity (SDE) has a statistically positively significance at a 10 
percent level to cost of funds, in the robustness regressions for Model 3. Except for this I 
found the results to be the same as in the OLS regressions.  
In the robustness regressions for Model 4 I found the results to be the same as in the OLS 
regressions, but in addition I found that the regional dummy variable MENA has a statistically 
positively significance at a 10 percent level to cost of funds. 
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I found that the regional dummy variable MENA has a statistically positively significance at a 
5 percent level instead of 10 percent as in the OLS regression, in the robustness regressions 
for Model 6, other that I found the results to be the consistent with the OLS regressions. 
 In the robustness regressions for Model 7-12 I found the results to be the consistent with the 
OLS regressions, but in addition I found that the organizational type dummy variable Bank 
has a statistically positively significance at a 10 percent level.  
This is the main difference in the robustness regressions in respect to the original OLS 
regressions, so as we can see most of the results are the same.  
 
Table 5-20: Regression result from the COF Model (Robustness check of Model 1, 2 and 3) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    t-value p-value    t-value p-value    t-value p-value 
(constant) 0,030 0,91 0,364 0,034 0,95 0,344 0,029 0,87 0,383 
PaR 0,008 0,22 0,830 0,004 0,11 0,913 0,007 1,18 0,857 
Age 0,000 -0,80 0,422 0,000 -0,85 0,393 0,000 -0,68 0,495 
SA -0,041 -2,91 0,004** -0,039 -2,79 0,006** -0,044 -3,10 0,002** 
Size 0,002 1,00 0,320 0,002 0,98 0,329 0,002 1,00 0,319 
Bank -0,011 -1.02 0,308 -0,011 -1,00 0,318 -0,012 -1,11 0,268 
NGO -0,010 -1,69 0,092* -0,010 -1,70 0,089* -0,009 -1,47 0,142 
EECA 0,031 2,79 0,006** 0,030 2,73 0,007** 0,029 2,67 0,008** 
MENA 0,015 1,23 0,221 0,015 1,26 0,209 0,015 1,24 0,215 
Asia 0,032 3,60 0,000** 0,033 3,73 0,000** 0,032 3,69 0,000** 
LA 0,033 4,33 0,000** 0,032 4,32 0,000** 0,031 4,15 0,000** 
DE 5,249E-5 0,42 0,675       
LDE    -7,126E-5 -0,50 0,617    
SDE       0,001 1,89 0,060* 
R
2
: 0,114 0,112 0,115 
F-test: 0,000 0,000 0,000 
N 343 338 336 
Dependent variable: COF 
**Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
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Table 5-21: Regression result from the COF Model (Robustness check of Model 4, 5 and 6) 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
    t-value p-value    t-value p-value    t-value p-value 
(constant) 0,001 0,04 0,967 0,027 0,81 0,418 0,016 0,52 0,601 
PaR 0,008 0,23 0,822 0,005 0,15 0,879 0,029 0,66 0,510 
Age 0,000 -0,41 0,679 0,000 -0,81 0,420 0,000 -0,72 0,475 
SA -0,011 -0,69 0,490 -0,038 -2,60 0,010** -0,089 -5,20 0,000** 
Size 0,002 1,01 0,311 0,002 1,06 0,292 0,001 0,62 0,538 
Bank -0,011 -1,02 0,309 -0,011 -1,01 0,315 -0,012 -1,06 0,289 
NGO -0,009 -1,50 0,136 -0,010 -1,69 0,093* -0,006 -1,10 0,274 
EECA 0,032 2,95 0,003** 0,030 2,64 0,009** 0,039 3,70 0,000** 
MENA 0,023 1,76 0,079* 0,015 1,23 0,219 0,026 2,28 0,024** 
Asia 0,017 1,93 0,054* 0,029 2,85 0,005** 0,044 4,97 0,000** 
LA 0,028 3,86 0,000** 0,032 4,15 0,000** 0,037 4,92 0,000** 
DA 0,052 4,49 0,000**       
LDA    0,007 0,58 0,563    
SDA       0,073 4,89 0,000** 
R
2
: 0,167 0,113 0,187 
F-test: 0,000 0,000 0,000 
N 343 339 337 
Dependent variable: COF 
**Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
Table 5-22: Regression result from the ROA Model (Robustness check of Model 7, 8 and 9) 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
    t-value p-value    t-value p-value    t-value p-value 
(constant) -0,126 -2,84 0,005** -0,130 -2,97 0,003** -0,126 -2,84 0,005** 
PaR -0,156 -2,62 0,009** -0,157 -2,61 0,009** -0,155 -2,61 0,009** 
Age 0,000 -0,57 0,568 0,000 -0,53 0,597 0,000 -0,55 0,583 
SA -0,004 -0,22 0,827 -0,005 -0,31 0,758 -0,005 -0,24 0,809 
Size 0,009 3,11 0,002** 0,009 3,20 0,002** 0,009 3,08 0,002** 
Bank 0,019 1,69 0,093* 0,019 1,67 0,095* 0,020 1,72 0,087* 
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NGO 0,009 1,14 0,256 0,010 1,25 0,213 0,010 1,24 0,216 
EECA 0,048 4,01 0,000** 0,048 3,97 0,000** 0,048 3,91 0,000** 
MENA 0,063 3,76 0,000** 0,063 3,73 0,000** 0,063 3,76 0,000** 
Asia 0,012 0,96 0,340 0,013 1,02 0,308 0,010 0,81 0,418 
LA 0,047 4,75 0,000** 0,048 4,86 0,000** 0,047 4,74 0,000** 
DE 0,000 -0,59 0,555       
LDE    0,000 -0,99 0,323    
SDE       -4,087E-5 -0,05 0,962 
R
2
: 0,204 0,209 0,206 
F-test: 0,000 0,000 0,000 
N 356 350 348 
Dependent variable: ROA 
**Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
Table 5-23: Regression result from the ROA Model (Robustness check of Model 10, 11 and 12) 
 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
    t-value p-value    t-value p-value    t-value p-value 
(constant) -0,093 -2,25 0,025** -0,109 -2,55 0,011** -0,122 -2,80 0,005** 
PaR -0,155 -2,88 0,004** -0,145 -2,42 0,016** -0,161 -2,74 0,006** 
Age 0,000 -0,95 0,345 0,000 -0,57 0,570 0,000 -0,54 0,588 
SA -0,048 -2,70 0,007** -0,024 -1,41 0,160 0,007 0,34 0,731 
Size 0,010 3,51 0,001** 0,009 3,15 0,002** 0,009 3,12 0,002** 
Bank 0,020 1,97 0,050* 0,020 1,77 0,078* 0,020 1,78 0,075* 
NGO 0,008 0,97 0,332 0,011 1,36 0,174 0,009 1,14 0,255 
EECA 0,044 3,79 0,000** 0,052 4,34 0,000** 0,045 3,59 0,000** 
MENA 0,051 3,11 0,002** 0,061 3,47 0,001** 0,060 3,61 0,000** 
Asia 0,028 2,25 0,025** 0,034 2,45 0,015** 0,007 0,58 0,565 
LA 0,052 5,30 0,000** 0,054 5,35 0,000** 0,046 4,62 0,000** 
DA -0,073 -4,84 0,000**       
LDA    -0,061 -3,64 0,000**    
SDA       -0,018 -0,90 0,369 
R
2
: 0,268 0,250 0,209 
F-test: 0,000 0,000 0,000 
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N 356 351 349 
Dependent variable: ROA 
**Significant at 5% level 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
5.5 Summary of the models 
Table 5-24 shows the summary of the significance of the regression models, it also 
presents the hypotheses that were proposed in chapter 3. We can see that almost all of the 
hypothesis have the same directions as the actual results, but there are some deviations. 
The savings to asset ratio was expected to have a positive effect on the performance, 
instead the results shows that it has a negative effect in the financial performance of MFIs 
in this study. 
Table 5-24: Summary of the regression models 
Variable On COF On ROA Hypothesis 
 Significance of 
   
Direction Significance of    Direction COF ROA 
Independent variables       
DE  +  - + - 
LDE  -  - + - 
SDE  +  - + - 
DA Significant + Significant - + - 
LDA  + Significant - + - 
SDA Significant +  - + - 
Control variables       
PaR  + Significant - - - 
Age  +  + + + 
SA Significant** - Significant**** -* + + 
Size  + Significant + + + 
Bank  -  +   
NGO  -  +   
EECA Significant + Significant +   
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MENA Significant*** + Significant***** +   
Asia Significant + Significant +   
LA Significant + Significant +   
+ if the explanatory variable increases (decreases) then the dependent variable increases (decreases) 
- if the explanatory variable decreases (increases) then the dependent variable increases (decreases) 
*Except from in Model 12, where it is positive 
**Except form in Model 4, where it is not significant 
***Only significant in Model 6 at a 10 percent significance level 
****Only significant in Model 10 
*****Only significant in Model 10 and Model 11 
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6. CONCLUSION  
6.1 Conclusion 
This study examined the effect of capital structure on MFIs financial performance. The results 
of this study support some earlier finding, but also provide some new ones.  
The regression results imply that there is a positively and significant relationship between 
total debt to assets and cost of funds. Further the short term debt to assets also have a 
positively and significant impact on cost of funds, which is consistent with the hypothesis. 
The ratios of total debt to equity, short term debt to equity and long term debt to assets all had 
a positive, but not significant effect in cost of funds. Long term debt to equity had a negative 
but not significantly effect on cost of funds, which is the opposite of what was suggested in 
the hypothesis. 
The regression results where return on assets was used as a measure of performance only total 
debt to assets and long term debt to assets have a significant and negatively impact on return 
on assets. These results are consistent with the previous studies. Abor (2007) concluded that 
capital structure, especially long term and debt ratios have a negative effect on performance of 
SMEs. There have also been some other studies that have proved empirical evidence 
supporting this negative relationship between debt levels and ROA (Cassar & Holmes, 2003; 
Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Silva, 2008). The ratios of total debt to equity, long term debt to 
equity, short term debt to equity and short term debt to assets also have a negative effect on 
return on assets, but none of them are significant. 
Savings to assets has a negative and significant effect on cost of funds in all of the regression 
models except from in Model 4, where debt to assets is used as a measure of capital structure. 
This is quite interesting because it is the opposite of what I had predicted in the hypothesis. 
Savings to assets also had a negative effect on return on assets, but it was not significant, 
except from in model 10 where debt to assets was used as a measure of capital structure. 
Portfolio at risk showed a negative and significant impact on return on assets, this is 
consistent whit the hypothesis. According to the regression results portfolio at risk has a 
positive effect on cost of funds, but this relationship is not significant. 
Size has a significantly positive effect on return on assets for all the regression models. It also 
has a positive effect on cost of funds, but this relationship is not significant. 
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6.2 Limitations and suggestion for new research  
The findings of this study are mainly based on data collected from 403 MFIs in 73 countries. 
The data have a certain sample selection bias, because it only includes data from MFIs who 
willingly have agreed to expose their accounts for scrutiny and rating. Because of this it is 
important to be aware of the fact that there might be some differences between rated and non 
rated MFIs. There were also some missing data in the dataset, and some of the MFIs have 
been excluded from this study due to unusual and influential data. Even though all of the 
numbers in the dataset have been annualized and dollarized when needed by using official 
exchange rates at the given time, there is reason to believe that that accounting principles 
might be different from country to country and socio economic factors may influence the 
consistency of the data. To identify the effect of capital structure on MFIs performance 
multiple regression were applied. This regression analysis is only measuring the degree of 
relationship, and not the causes of the relationship. Most of the variables in the regression 
results have the same impact on the performance as suggested in the hypothesis, but 
unfortunately many of them are not significant, this might imply that the models are not so 
good. The low values of R
2
 show that the spread around the regression line is quite high. But 
even though the R
2
 values are low it may still result in statistically significant effect being 
detected in the regression model (Brooks, 2008). 
The performance of MFIs can be measured in several ways and by a number of different 
variables, this study only used cost of funds and return on assets as performance measures of 
MFIs. So further studies could include more or different dependent variables, it would also be 
interesting to take a closer look at the effect different control variables have on the 
performance, for example savings. 
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